<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<document>
<title>Operation Charnwood</title>
<authors>Wikipedia</authors>
<publisher>wikipedia.org</publisher>
<publishedplace>network</publishedplace>
<publishedyear>2010</publishedyear>
<edition></edition>
<category>Battle for Caen</category>
<section id="32117" fatherid="0" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="1">
Operation Charnwood was a Second World War Anglo-Canadian offensive that took place from 8–9 July 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The operation was intended to capture the German-occupied city of Caen (), which was a major Allied objective during the opening stages of Operation Overlord. It was also hoped that the attack would pre-empt the transfer of German armoured units from the Anglo-Canadian sector to the lightly-screened American sector, where the eventual Allied breakout was to be made. The British and Canadians advanced on a broad front and by the evening of the second day had taken the northern half of Caen, up to the Orne and Odon rivers.
Preceded by a controversial bombing raid that destroyed much of Caen's historic Old City, Operation Charnwood began at dawn on 8 July, with battalions of three infantry divisions attacking German positions north of Caen behind a creeping artillery barrage. Supported by three armoured brigades, the forces of the British I Corps made gradual progress against the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend and 16th Luftwaffe Field Division. By the end of the day the 3rd Canadian and British 3rd and 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Divisions had cleared the villages in their path and reached Caen's outskirts. Moving into the city at dawn the following morning, the Allies encountered resistance from remnants of German units who were beginning a withdrawal across the Orne. Carpiquet airfield fell to the Canadians during the early morning and by 18:00, the British and Canadians had linked up and were on the Orne's north bank. Discovering Caen's remaining bridges to be defended or impassable and with German reserves positioned to oppose their crossing, I Corps closed down the operation.
With northern Caen's capture and the heavy casualties inflicted on the two German divisions defending the immediate sector, Operation Charnwood was a tactical success. Operationally, it achieved mixed results; although it forced the Germans to pull back all formations north of the Orne River, it did not stop the flow of formations to the American front. The Germans were able to establish a strong second defensive line along two ridges to the south of the city but the Allies maintained the initiative and launched the simultaneous Anglo-Canadian operations Goodwood and Atlantic  a week later, during which the rest of Caen was secured.

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<section id="32118" fatherid="0" title="Background" lv="" priority="-2" level="1">
The Normandy town of Caen was one of the D-Day objectives for the British 3rd Infantry Division which landed on Sword Beach on 6 June 1944.Williams, p. 24 The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", was described by historian L F Ellis as the most important D-Day objective assigned to Lieutenant-General Crockers's I Corps. Operation Overlord called for the British Second Army to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the southeast of Caen, in order to acquire airfields and protect the  flank of the United States First Army while it moved on Cherbourg.Ellis, p. 78 Possession of Caen and its environs would give Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could then be used as the pivot for a swing  to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River.Ellis, p. 81 The terrain between Caen and Vimont was especially attractive to Allied planners, being open, dry, and conducive to swift offensive operations. Since the Allies greatly outnumbered the Germans in tanks and mobile units, creating the conditions for a fluid, fast moving battle was to their advantage.Van Der Vat, p. 146
The 3rd Infantry Division came ashore as planned, but hampered by congestion in its beachhead, the diversion of its strength en route, and the late arrival of much of its armoured support, the division was unable to assault Caen in force and its lead elements were brought to a halt short of the city's outskirts.Cawthorne, p. 41Van der Vat, p. 114 Follow-up attacks were unsuccessful as German resistance solidified around the rapidly-arriving 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, so the British abandoned the direct approach and on 7 June launched Operation Perch, a pincer attack by I and XXX Corps. The intention was to encircle Caen from the east and west.Ellis, p. 250 However I Corps, striking south of the Orne River, was halted by the 21st Panzer DivisionVan der Vat, p. 139 while XXX Corps's attack to the west of Caen stalled near Tilly-sur-Seulles in the face of heavy opposition from the Panzer-Lehr-Division. In an effort to force Panzerlehr to withdraw the British 7th Armoured Division attacked the German flank, on 13 June through a gap in the line, aiming for high ground near Villers-Bocage.D'Este, p. 172 The resulting day-long tank battle ended when the 7th Armoured's vanguard was pulled back;Taylor, p. 76 the Panzer-Lehr-Division held its position until XXX Corps captured Tilly-sur-Seulles on 19 June.Clay, pp. 262-263
 
The next British offensive, codenamed Operation Epsom, was launched by VIII Corps on 26 June. Preceded by Operation MartletClark, p. 21 (also known as Operation Dauntless)Ellis, p. 275 to secure the corps's  flank, VIII Corps advanced to the west of Caen on a four-mile (6.4 km) front between Carpiquet and Rauray.Hastings, p. 138 Once across the Odon and Orne rivers the corps was to make for high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize and encircle Caen.Clark, pp. 32-33Clark, pp. 31-32 The Germans managed to contain the offensive, but to do so were obliged to commit all their available strength,Hart, p. 108 including two SS panzer divisions newly arrived in Normandy and earmarked for a planned offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux.Wilmot, p. 334
On 27 June the 3rd Infantry Division’s 8th Infantry Brigade, supported by the Staffordshire Yeomanry and specialist armour from the 79th Armoured Division, launched Operation Mitten. The objective was to seize two German-occupied châteaux—la Londe and le Landel. The initial evening assault, led by the South Lancashire Regiment, was repulsed, but the following morning further attacks gained the objectives and destroyed several German tanks. Operation Mitten cost at least three British tanksFortin, p. 30 and 268 men.Copp (2004), p. 113 Norman Scarfe claims that had Mitten gone more smoothly, the 9th Brigade, supported by the Canadian 9th Infantry Brigade, would have launched Operation Aberlour, an ambitious plan to capture the villages of la Bijude, Épron, Galmache, St. Contest, Authie and Cussy. However, this was cancelled by I Corps's commander Lieutenant-General John Crocker.Scarfe, pp. 68-69 Historian Terry Copp calls the fighting for these châteaus the "bloodiest square mile in Normandy".
With Caen's strategic value to the Germans apparently lessening, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, in overall command of German forces in the west (OB West), directed on 1 July that the city should be gradually abandoned. Rundstedt's intent was to shift the bulk of his armoured divisions to the American front,Keegan, p. 187 but the city and its surroundings were considered by the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) to be the linchpin of Normandy's defence. OKW was determined to hold an arc of defensible terrain from the English Channel to the western banks of the Orne;Daglish, p. 36 Adolf Hitler's response was to dismiss Rundstedt from command and replace him with Generalfeldmarschall Gunther von Kluge.D'Este, p. 251 Learning of this, the Allied ground forces commander, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, drew up an offensive with two goals: to capture Caen and to prevent a large scale redeployment of German forces from the Anglo-Canadian sector to the American front.D'Este, p. 305
On 4 July, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division launched Operation Windsor, designed to seize Carpiquet and the adjacent airfield from the 12th SS Panzer Division.Copp (2004), p. 99 Although Carpiquet fell on 5 July, the airfield remained in German hands.Van der Vat, p. 150

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<section id="32119" fatherid="0" title="Planning and preparation" lv="" priority="-3" level="1">
<section id="32120" fatherid="32119" title="Allies" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
The objective of Charnwood was to clear Caen of its defenders up to the Orne river, and if possible to secure bridgeheads in southern Caen.Stacey, p. 157 To achieve the latter it was planned to send an armoured column through the city to rush the bridges;Wilmot, p. 351 it was hoped that I Corps could exploit the situation to sweep on through southern Caen towards the Verrières and Bourguébus ridges, paving the way for the British Second Army to advance towards Falaise.
Crocker's 115,000-strong I CorpsEllis, p. 310 was assigned the task of penetrating to the Orne and Odon rivers. The 3rd Infantry Division would attack on a one brigade front from the north-east, supported by the 33rd Armoured Brigade; the 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division would attack on a two brigade front from the north, supported by the 27th Armoured Brigade; and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division would attack on a one brigade front from the northwest, supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. To maintain the maximum possible pressure on German forces in the sector,Jackson, p. 61 VIII Corps was placed on 24 hours notice to launch further attacks to the west of Caen.
In the light of lessons learned from the partial Canadian success during Operation Windsor, Charnwood was to be launched on a broad front to increase the pressure on the German defences and disperse their defensive fire.Buckley (2004), p. 31 SHAEF planners had advised, on 10 June, that the best way to break any future stalemate was to use air power to support an attack; this method was to be usedBuckley (2006), p. 49 for Charnwood as Montgomery enlisted the aid of RAF Bomber Command. Heavy bombers would attack Caen on the night preceding the assault, with 15% of the total bomb load being delayed action bombs set to explode when the ground attack was launched. A second wave of light bombers would follow the heavies, and a third wave of American bombers would attack on the morning of the operation.Trew, pp. 34, 36, 37 Additional support would be provided by rocket firing Typhoons,Scarfe, p. 70 the monitor HMS Roberts, the light cruisers HMS Belfast and HMS Emerald, and the 16-inch guns of the battleship .Ellis, p. 311 656 guns from five divisions were tasked by Dempsey and Crocker with bombarding known German positions to the south.Copp (2004), p. 101 In all, it was planned that 2,000 tons of bombs would be dropped on Caen before the infantry assault began. However, due to the target area's proximity to the Allied lines and the resultant risk of friendly casualties, the aiming point for the bombers was shifted  to the south—beyond most of the main German defences screening the city.Keegan, p. 188 Following a long saturation bombardment, the three infantry divisions were to push through the fortified villages in their path and advance directly into Caen's northern suburbs.Hastings, pp. 222-223

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<section id="32121" fatherid="32119" title="Germans" lv="" priority="-2" level="2">
The 12th SS Panzer Division, commanded by Kurt Meyer, consisted of three panzergrenadier regiments including one—the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment—borrowed from the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (1st SS Panzer Division).Reginald, p. 46Reynolds (2001), p. 152  With its 61 surviving tanksTrew, p. 35 12th SS Panzer was holding the northwest approaches to Caen, defending the city and Carpiquet airfield from the 3rd Canadian and 59th British Infantry Divisions.Copp (2004), p. 102 The main German defensive line, a  arc of villages from the northeast to the west, was held by the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and elements of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment.Swanston, p. 278 Troops from the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment were holding the western flank, concentrating their strength, which included mortar batteries and a few tanks, in the area around Carpiquet airfield. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was occupying a line from Franqueville to the western end of Eterville; the villages formed mutually-supporting strongpoints with dug-in tanks and assault guns, and the defensive line was 2–3 miles (3.2–4.8 km) in depth, supplemented by anti-tank ditches, weapons pits, minefields and other obstacles.Ellis, pp. 310-311 The rest of the division, with 35 tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment, were held in reserve, with elements located north, west and south of the city.Reynolds (2001), pp. 152-153 Most of the division's artillery had been moved back across the Orne, and the divisional command centre had been relocated from the Ardenne Abbey to Abbaye-aux-Dames in the centre of Caen.
The 16th Luftwaffe Field Division was an inexperienced infantry division that had only recently arrived in Normandy to relieve the 21st Panzer Division of its defence of Caen and its positions east of the Caen canal.Meyer, pp. 472-473 The division was under-trained and lacked sufficient anti tank weapons; to remedy the latter it was reinforced with a tank battalion from 21st Panzer. The Luftwaffe division was deployed on both sides of the Orne, with three battalions holding the villages to the immediate north of the city.
The 1st SS Panzer Division was roughly  south of Caen with a regiment of dual purpose 88 mm guns from the III Flak Corps. The II SS Panzer Corps was to the west, with the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg around  southwest of the city.Ellis, pp. 311-312

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</section>
<section id="32122" fatherid="0" title="Preliminary attacks" lv="" priority="-4" level="1">
On the night of 7 July, 467 Lancaster and Halifax heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force—half of Bomber Command's available strength at that time—attacked Caen, dropping over 2,000 tons of bombs on the city. Although intended mainly to facilitate the Anglo-Canadian advance and to prevent German reinforcements from reaching the battle or retreating through Caen,Ellis, p. 313Trew, p. 37 a secondary consideration was the suppression of the German defences. In this the bombing largely failed; the main German armour and infantry positions to the north of Caen remained intact. Several tanks were hit and temporarily disabled, but only two Panzer IVs of the 12th SS Panzer Division were destroyed. However, General Miles Dempsey, in command of the British Second Army, was more concerned with the bombing's morale-boosting effect on his troops than any material losses it might inflict on the Germans.
The pathfinders of No. 625 Squadron RAF, tasked with dropping the target markers for the bombers, were instructed not to allow the target zone to "drift back" towards the Allied lines as had been the tendency in earlier missions. Together with the cautious shifting of the target zone during the planning stage, the effect was that in many cases the markers were dropped too far forward, pushing the bombed zone well into Caen itself and further away from the German defences. By 22:00 on 7 July the bombers had departed, leaving 80% of the city's northern sector destroyed.Van der Vat, p. 153 Caen University was particularly hard hit, starting chemical fires that soon spread.
At 22:50, six squadrons of fast Mosquito bombers attacked individual targets, and ten minutes later the 636 guns of the assaulting divisions opened fire, with the battleship Rodney and other ships adding their support. This prolonged bombardment was intensified by the artillery of VIII Corps, which targeted the villages north of Caen in an effort to eliminate German strongpoints before the infantry assault began.

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<section id="32123" fatherid="0" title="Advance begins" lv="" priority="5" level="1">
At 04:30 on 8 July, the artillery regiments of I and VIII Corps shifted their fire deeper into the German defensive belt, along the axes of advance of the Canadian 3rd and British 59th Infantry Divisions. As the infantry and armour moved off their start-lines the barrage slowly crept forward, concentrating its fire on positions in front of the Anglo-Canadian troops;Copp (2004), p. 103 four battalions and two armoured regiments advancing on a two brigade front. At 07:00, 192 B-26 Marauder medium bombers arrived over the battlefield, but finding it obscured by cloud only 87 aircraft were able to drop their payload, totalling 133 tons. However, some bombs landed on the 12th SS Headquarters at Abbaye-aux-Dames.
Crocker launched the operation's second phase at 07:30, although neither division had yet reached its objectives. In particular, the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was still in control of high ground around the Carpiquet airfield on the  flank of the advance. On the , however, facing the relatively weak defences of the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, the British 3rd Infantry were making good progress. They attacked Lébisey and rapidly pushed through the village, although fighting intensified as the division reached Herouville.D'Este, p. 318 Concerned about the state of the Luftwaffe division, General Heinrich Eberbach, in command of Panzer Group West, ordered the 21st Panzer Division to redeploy northeast of Caen in support of the 16th.Trew, p. 39 The manoeuvre was spotted, and when 21st Panzer attempted to cross the Caen Canal a strong naval barrage was directed against them. Facing the possibility of heavy losses, the move was abandoned.
In the centre, the 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division was encountering much stiffer resistance from the 12th SS Panzer Regiment in Galmanche and la Bijude.Ellis, pp. 314-315 The 176th Infantry Brigade incurred particularly heavy casualties in la Bijude, with one infantry company losing all of its senior officers when German flak batteries—pressed into service in an anti-tank role—prevented armoured support from reaching the village. The 176th's running-mate, the 197th Brigade, bypassed Galmanche and by noon had reached St-Contest.
Further to the west, units of the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division's 9th Infantry Brigade had been involved in heavy fighting in Buron, which was defended by 200 men from the 12th SS. With support from the 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment, by noon Buron had been taken, although the 9th Brigade's assault companies suffered 60% casualties in doing so.Copp (2004), p. 104 South of Buron, a counterattack by Panzer IV and Panther tanks of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment was defeated by M10 Achilles self-propelled anti-tank guns and 17-pounder anti tank guns of 254th Battery, 62nd Antitank Regiment. Thirteen German tanks were destroyed in one of the most successful antitank engagement of the campaign, for the loss of four tank destroyers and a further four damaged.Copp (2004), pp. 103-104, 296-297 Gruchy was captured with relative ease, with the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade encountering only mortar and artillery fire in their drive to Authie. The capture of Authie facilitated the 59th (Staffordshire) Division's assault on St-Contest, and that town fell too, clearing the way for an advance on Caen itself. In Phase 3 of the operation, the 7th Brigade pushed towards the 12th SS Panzer Division's former headquarters at Ardenne Abbey, securing the position before midnight.Copp (2004), p. 105
The British 3rd Infantry Division had by now brushed aside 16th Luftwaffe and was approaching Caen's outskirts from the northeast. At 19:15 that evening, both Meyer and Eberbach authorised the withdrawal of all 12th SS Panzer's heavy weapons, and the remnants of the Luftwaffe division, across the Orne to the southern side of Caen. Throughout the early evening the 12th SS fought a rearguard action against elements of the 59th and 3rd Infantry Divisions as it pulled back from positions no longer considered tenable.Wood, p. 92 Reports of this withdrawal came in to the British and Canadian divisional headquarters, prompting Crocker to prepare for I Corps to secure Caen the following day.

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<section id="32124" fatherid="0" title="Fighting in Caen" lv="" priority="6" level="1">
Anglo-Canadian patrols began to infiltrate the city at dawn on 9 July. Carpiquet Airfield finally fell into Allied hands during the early morning, when the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division discovered that the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment had withdrawn during the night. North of Caen, the 59th Staffordshires encountered opposition from a battlegroup of the 21st Panzer Division, but with the German situation north of the river becoming increasingly precarious, 21st Panzer's battlegroups and the remaining regiments of the 12th SS Panzer Division conducted a slow withdrawal across the Orne, making for the Verrières and Bourguébus Ridges.Wood, p. 93 By noon the British 3rd Infantry Division had reached the Orne's north bank, virtually destroying the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division in the process. A few hours later the British and Canadians linked up in the centre of the city, and by 18:00 the northern half of Caen was firmly under Allied control; all I Corps's objectives had been achieved. A few of Caen's bridges were still intact, but these were either blocked by rubble or defended by German troops on the south bank, and the 1st SS Panzer Division had by now positioned itself to oppose any further advance.Ellis, p. 316
The 12th SS Panzer Division—by the end of the battle reduced to a battalion-sized infantry unit—claimed over the course of two days to have destroyed 103 British and Canadian tanksWood, p. 99 for the loss of 20 of its own. On entering Caen the Anglo-Canadian troops found it in ruins, with four-fifths of the Old City reduced to rubble by the 7 July bombings. The debris that choked the streets made it almost impossible for British armour to manoeuvre through the northern half of the city, effectively preventing Second Army from exploiting I Corps's success.D'Este, p. 319 Without possession of the terrain flanking the south of the city, no further gains could be made within Caen,Hastings, p. 223Copp (2004), p. 106 so by mid-afternoon on 9 July, Operation Charnwood was over.

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<section id="32125" fatherid="0" title="Aftermath" lv="" priority="-7" level="1">
<section id="32126" fatherid="32125" title="Operation Jupiter" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
On 10 July, the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division attacked the positions of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg to the southwest of Caen on Hill 112. Preceded by a two-day bombardment that included support from naval vessels and Hawker Typhoons, the assault was designed to threaten Caen from the west and push back the 10th SS Panzer Division. This would secure the British Second Army an avenue for future offensives. The 43rd Wessex began their assault at dawn on 10 July, supported by two armoured brigades.
By 08:00 British tanks and infantry were engaged with 10th SS Panzer and "well up" the slopes of Hill 112. Eterville was taken around mid-morning; as the 4th Armoured Brigade and 43rd Wessex pressed their attack, Panzer Group West commander General Eberbach insisted that "Hill 112 is the pivotal point of the whole position West of Caen, and must therefore be held". The 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion and the 1st SS Panzer Division were committed to its defence. The 4th Armoured Brigade reached the summit,Hastings, p. 225 but in the evening were counterattacked by remnants of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions.Hastings, p. 226
The British offensive resumed the following day with the support of antitank regiments from the Second Army; these had heavy losses in a counterattack by the 102nd Panzer Battalion.Hastings, p. 227 Hill 112 was briefly taken by a battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, only to be lost to further German counterattacks in the late afternoon. By the evening of 11 July, with both sides exhausted and having suffered heavily, the offensive had reached a stalemate. The 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division and its supporting armour had sustained two thousand casualties in the two days of fighting.

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<section id="32127" fatherid="32125" title="Overall" lv="" priority="-2" level="2">
With Caen north of the River Orne in Allied hands, mine-clearance operations were launched, bulldozers were set to work to clear the streets, and a convoy of trucks carrying supplies for the civilian population was brought in. On 10 July the French flag was raised over the city, and three days later a parade was held in the Place Saint-Martin during which a second flag was raised to the strains of Scottish bagpipers playing La Marseillaise.Beevor, p. 273
Meanwhile Rommel and Eberbach were consolidating their defensive positions in and around southern Caen, the 12th, 1st, and 9th SS Panzer Divisions turning the Bourguébus and Verrières Ridges into formidable barriers. Having already committed all of his armoured reserves, Rommel transferred the remainder of his infantry divisions—the 708th, 276th, 277th, and 272nd—to the Anglo-Canadian front. On 8 July he released the remnants of the Panzer Lehr and the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich to the American sector. Panzerlehr, at the start of the campaign one of the most powerful armoured formations in the German army,Forty, p. 29 was by this stage reduced to a number of battlegroups and no longer functional as a division.Copp (2004), p. 86 On 17 July, Rommel's staff car was strafed by British fighters, severely injuring the Field Marshal and confining him to hospital. Two days later he was replaced as Army Group B commander by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge.Wood, p. vii Rommel never returned to Normandy; implicated in the 20 July plot against Hitler, on 14 October he was forced to commit suicide.Cawthorne, p. 121
Caen's partial capture allowed General Omar Bradley, in command of the First United States Army, to accelerate his own plans for a breakout. Shortly after Charnwood the US VII Corps attacked German positions in Saint-Lo,Van der Vat, p. 158D'Este, pp. 339-341 which the 2nd SS Panzer Division had been ordered to "hold at all costs".Wood, p. 99Wood, p. 100 On 18 July, after eight days of fighting during which 95% of the town was destroyed and VII Corps took more than 5,000 casualties,Hastings, p. 249 Saint-Lo fell to the Americans.Van der Vat, p. 159
The same day, Dempsey's Second Army launched Operation Goodwood with between 1,100–1,300 tanks participating in the largest armoured battle in British military history. General Richard O'Connor's VIII Corps spearheaded the drive towards the Bourguébus Ridge with three armoured divisions, supported by Crocker's I Corps. After a preliminary attack by 1,056 heavy bombers,Trew, pp. 71-72 elements of the 11th, Guards and 7th Armoured Divisions assaulted the positions of LXXXVI Corps north of Bourguébus,Reynolds (2001), pp. 170-171 but despite early gains of around , strong resistance prevented VIII Corps taking the ridge. Simultaneously, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds's newly activated II Canadian Corps launched its own offensive on the Verrières Ridge, codenamed Operation Atlantic.D'Este, p. 357 II Corps ran into fierce opposition; during the seven-day battle that followed the Canadians sustained 2,800 casualties. Verrières Ridge would remain in German hands until 8 August.Zuehlke, p. 168Hastings, p. 296

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<section id="32128" fatherid="32125" title="Battle honours" lv="" priority="3" level="2">
The British and Commonwealth system of battle honours recognises the battle by the award to 55 units of the honour Caen, for participation in the capture of Caen between 4-18 July 1944. Awarded from 1956 to 1959, the recognition was accompanied by honours for taking part in Operation Charnwood. For participating in the capture of Caen between 8-9 July three units were awarded the honour Orne, nine the honour The Orne, and two the honour The Orne (Buron).Rodger, pp. 243-244
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</section>
<section id="32129" fatherid="0" title="Analysis" lv="" priority="8" level="1">
<section id="32130" fatherid="32129" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
Military historian Anthony Beevor calls Operation Charnwood a partial success, because although much of Caen was taken, the British and Canadians ultimately failed to secure enough ground to expand the Allied build-up; the bulk of the First Canadian Army was still waiting in the United Kingdom for transfer to Normandy. Carlo D'Este states that unquestionably Charnwood did improve Second Army's position, but with the high ground to the south of the city in German hands, Caen itself was useless. He writes that the capture of the city was too little, too late, and a hollow victory.D’Este, pp. 318-319 Chester Wilmot partially expands on this theme, stating that the southern suburbs with their factories and communications network were needed by Montgomery to maintain a credible threat to German-occupied Paris. Historians John Buckley and Terry Copp note that by the time the city was captured, the Germans—weakened by the battles of late June and early July—had already established defensive positions on the high ground to the south of the Orne;Copp, p. 106 positions that blocked the way to the open terrain of the Falaise plain. In Charnwood's aftermath, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, expressed his concern that a breakout was now unlikely; it seemed as though the Germans would be able to keep the Allies penned up in Normandy. However, Montgomery did not subscribe to his chief's pessimism; in his opinion, the tenacity of the German defence was no barometer of its longevity.Wilmot, p. 352 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was apparently of the same mind; he mentioned to Lieutenant-Colonel Caesar von Hofacker that the front-line in France could only be held for another three weeks. Hofacker was a member of the German resistance and linked with the Hitler assassination plot, and according to historian Simon Trew, Rommel's comment led to the plot's timetable being decided.Trew, pp. 47-48
The serious losses sustained in maintaining an increasingly costly static defence during June led to fractures in the German high command. On 1 July, Panzer Group West commander Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg had been replaced by Heinrich Eberbach, following disagreements with Hitler over how the campaign should be conducted.Ellis, pp. 320- 322 The Commander in Chief West (OB West) soon followed; that evening, in a telephone conversation with OKW head Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, von Rundstedt advised "Make peace, you fools."Wilmot. p. 347 Taken to task over his endorsement of von Schweppenburg's recommendation for a withdrawal, he replied "If you doubt what we're doing, get up here and take over this shambles yourself".Hastings, p. 207 The following morning, informed that perhaps his health was "no longer up to the task", von Rundstedt resigned and was succeeded as OB West by Günther von Kluge. However, the costly battles in and around Caen and Saint-Lô  convinced both Eberbach and von Kluge that their predecessors had been correct.Copp, p. 109 The Germans had suffered heavily, leading Hitler to order Army Group B to temporarily abandon all major counterattacks and go over to the defensive until more reinforcements could arrive to bolster the front.
Trew acknowledges that the capture of northern Caen had a psychological impact on the French population, convincing them the Allies were there to stay and that the liberation of France could not be far off. By Operation Charnwood's conclusion, Allied losses since 6 June had amounted to over 30,000 men, excluding those who had been evacuated due to sickness or those suffering from battle exhaustion.Copp, p. 110 Buckley believes Charnwood to have been a good idea, but one that proved better in concept than in execution—influenced as it was by the mounting political pressure on 21st Army Group to produce results.Buckley (2006), p. 8 In contrast, Copp states that the broad-based assault plan across the entire front worked, preventing the Germans bringing to bear superior firepower on any one formation. He suggests that Charnwood should have produced a rapid breakthrough, but concedes that the battle was one of the most difficult of the campaign.Copp (2004), p. 101-103 Buckley singles out poor cooperation between armoured and infantry units as one of the reasons for such high Allied losses; he is critical of the habit of tanks standing off from German positions and directing the infantry onto the objective, instead of moving forward to give close support. He further notes that from the German perspective, the Anglo-Canadian forces apparently lacked the desire or ability to press home their advantages, citing Kurt Meyer’s opinion that during the battle the Allies allowed the opportunity of destroying his 12th SS Panzer Division to elude them. However, Buckley also comments on the defensive power of the British and Canadian formations. The German practice of conducting immediate localised counterattacks to retake lost ground cost them many of their best troops; losses they could ill-afford. He illustrates this with a typical action during which the Germans lost 13 tanks to British self-propelled anti-tank guns.

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<section id="32131" fatherid="32129" title="Bombing of Caen" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
One aspect of Operation Charnwood that has particularly exercised commentators was the decision to bomb Caen. Max Hastings writes that the bombing came to be seen by many as "one of the most futile air attacks of the war", a position supported by Beevor, who calls the attack a "disaster". Historian Michael Reynolds describes the results of the bombing as "pathetic",Reynolds (2001), p. 153 while D'Este states that not only did it do little to assist I Corps, but actually hindered the Allied push into the city. D’Este quotes Air Commodore E.J. Kingston-McCloughry and Solly Zuckerman, who conducted a survey following Caen's capture and concluded that no targets of military value had been attacked nor were there any gun positions, tanks, or German dead in the target zone. Additionally they interviewed men of the British 3rd Infantry Division, who were reportedly bewildered as to why the bombers had been employed.D’Este, p. 315 However, the 3rd Division’s historian, Norman Scarfe, counters this position, stating that in the wake of the air-raid the men "for the first time for weeks breathed freely. The full support of the Air Force gave them full hearts ... and the men were encouraged".Scarfe, pp. 69-70 The campaign’s Canadian official historian, Charles Stacey, takes a similar line, citing several Canadian formations who reported an increase in morale.Stacey, p. 158 Wilmot claims that the bombing was essential for this reason; it raised Second Army's morale while reducing that of the German defenders. A 21st Army Group intelligence report based on the interrogation of German prisoners goes so far as to claim the raid was "decisive"; it had reportedly destroyed the headquarters of the Luftwaffe infantry regiment based north of Caen, and deprived the German troops north of the city of ammunition and rations the following morning. Peter Gray grants that the bombing had an effect on the morale of both sides, but contends that this was only temporary.Buckley (2006), p. 166 The campaign's official British historian, L.F. Ellis, along with Trew and Stephen Badsey, provides an alternative interpretation; they state that the raid was designed to hamper the city's lines of communication, cutting off German reinforcements from the battle and hindering any attempt to withdraw south of the Orne river. However, Stacey notes that it was "obvious and desirable" for maximum advantage that the Allied ground forces should have advanced on the heels of the attack. Gray’s conclusion is that one "cannot satisfactorily answer the question why" the city was bombed.Buckley (2006), p. 167
Analysis by Operational Research Section Number 2 (ORS2) concluded that the bombing of the first aiming point northwest of Caen was accurate, finding that the centre of the 90% zone (where 90% of the bombs fell) was 200-300 yards east of the aiming point, with some spillage to the south and west. Examination of the area after its capture indicated some destruction of German equipment, including the wreckage of 10 of the 40 trucks believed to be in the area at the time of the raid. The 48 hours that elapsed between the bombing and the Allied occupation of the area allowed the Germans time to recover from any shock and disorientation, and to salvage some damaged equipment. Examination of the second aiming point, "Northern Caen", failed to reveal a 90% zone, but it was noted that the obstructive effect of bombing a suburb was significant, and had caused substantial delays to vehicles of both sides by cratering and blocking roads. ORS2 concluded that the success of Charnwood owed little to the bombing, but made recommendations including changing to instantly fused bombs, dropping larger loads of smaller anti-personnel bombs, and rapidly following-up a bombardment with ground forces to take advantage of its main effect—the temporary suppression of the enemy's will to resist. The benefit of this advice would be seen in subsequent operations; Goodwood, Operation Bluecoat, Operation Cobra, Operation Totalize and Operation Tractable all showed a distinct improvement in the ability of 21st Army Group to exploit the effect of preparatory strategic bombing.Copp (2000), pp. 71-77
The British initially announced that around 6,000 civilians had died during the air-raid, and a Soviet war correspondent attached to the 21st Army Group, Lieutenant Colonel Kraminov, put the figure as high as 22,000—a claim that would later be used by French communists in post-war anti-British propaganda.Beevor, p. 269 However, it transpired after investigation that only 300-400 civilians were killed during the operation.Stacey, p. 160 Despite the hardships they suffered, Caen's citizens showed genuine relief and provided their liberators with a welcome that the troops found very moving; French accounts of the time claim that "All of Caen was in the streets to greet them". Although Ellis calls the French welcome "pathetic", no Allied unit recorded any complaints about the reception they were given.Stacey, p. 163Trew, p. 44 Stacey reports that the populace were "particularly delighted to find their city freed in part by men from Canada." Beevor makes the point that most of the population were numb from the events they had gone through; he quotes a British soldier who recalled that "most ... women were crying, grief-stricken and anguished". As early as 12 June the French Resistance had sent messengers to the British, informing them that refugees were gathering in the areas around the Abbaye-aux-Hommes and the Hopital du Bon Sauveur, and begging for these locations not to be bombed. Assurances were duly given, and these locations were almost untouched during the battle. Gray notes that the city, following the war, regarded itself as being martyred; a perception that remains to this day and is reflected in the city’s war memorial.Buckley (2006), pp. 158, 168

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<section id="32132" fatherid="0" title="Notes" lv="" priority="-9" level="1">
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<section id="32133" fatherid="0" title="References" lv="" priority="-10" level="1">
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<section id="32134" fatherid="0" title="External links" lv="" priority="-11" level="1">
Category:Operation Overlord
Category:Military history of Normandy
Category:World War II operations and battles of Europe
Category:Battles and operations of World War II
Charnwood, Operation
Category:Battles of World War II involving Canada
Charnwood, Operation
Charnwood, Operation

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