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<title>Battle of Moscow</title>
<authors>Wikipedia</authors>
<publisher>wikipedia.org</publisher>
<publishedplace>network</publishedplace>
<publishedyear>2010</publishedyear>
<edition></edition>
<category>Articles containing German language text</category>
<section id="23785" fatherid="0" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="1">
The Battle of Moscow (, Romanized: Bitva pod Moskvoy, ) is the name given by Soviet historians to two periods of strategically significant fighting on a 600 km sector of the Eastern Front during World War II. It took place between October 1941 and January 1942. The Soviet defensive effort frustrated Hitler's strategy that considered Moscow, capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the largest Soviet city, to be the primary military and political objective for Axis forces in their invasion of the Soviet Union.
The German strategic offensive named Operation Typhoon was planned to conduct two pincer offensives, one to the north of Moscow against the Kalinin Front by the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, simultaneously severing the Moscow - Leningrad railway, and another to the south of Moscow Oblast against the Western Front, south of Tula by the 2nd Panzer Army, while the 4th Army advanced directly towards Moscow from the west. A separate operational German plan, codenamed Operation Wotan, was included in the final phase of the German offensive.
Initially, the Soviet forces conducted a strategic defence of the Moscow Oblast by constructing three defensive belts, and deploying newly raised reserve armies as well as bringing troops from the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts. Subsequently, as the German offensives were halted, a Soviet strategic counter-offensive and smaller-scale offensive operations were executed to force German armies back to the positions around the cities of Oryol, Vyazma and Vitebsk, nearly surrounding three German armies in the process.

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<section id="23786" fatherid="0" title="German planning" lv="" priority="2" level="1">
The original blitzkrieg invasion plan, which the Axis called Operation Barbarossa, called for the capture of Moscow within four months. However, despite large initial advances, the Wehrmacht was slowed by Soviet resistance (in particular during the Battle of Smolensk, which lasted from July through September 1941 and delayed the German offensive towards Moscow for two months). Having secured Smolensk, the Wehrmacht chose to consolidate its lines around Leningrad and Kiev, further delaying the drive towards Moscow. The Axis advance was renewed on October 2, 1941, with an offensive codenamed Operation Typhoon, to complete the capture of Moscow before the onset of winter.
After an advance leading to the encirclement and destruction of several Soviet armies, the Soviets stopped the Germans at the Mozhaisk defensive line, just 120 km (75 mi) from the capital. Having penetrated the Soviet defenses, the Wehrmacht offensive was slowed by weather conditions, with autumn rains turning roads and fields into thick mud that significantly impeded Axis vehicles, horses, and soldiers. Although the onset of colder weather and the freezing of the ground allowed the Axis advance to continue, it continued to struggle against stiffening Soviet resistance.
By early December, the lead German Panzer Groups stood less than 30 kilometers (19 mi) from the Kremlin, and Wehrmacht officers were able to see some of Moscow's buildings with binoculars; but the Axis forces were unable to make further advances. On December 5, 1941, fresh Soviet Siberian troops, prepared for winter warfare, attacked the German forces in front of Moscow; by January 1942, the Soviets had driven the  Wehrmacht back 100 to 250 km (60 to 150 mi), ending the immediate threat to Moscow and marking the closest that Axis forces ever got to capturing the Soviet capital.
The Battle of Moscow was one of the most important battles of World War II, primarily because the Soviets were able to successfully prevent the most serious attempt to capture their capital. The battle was also one of the largest during the war, with more than a million total casualties. It marked a turning point as it was the first time since the Wehrmacht began its conquests in 1939 that it had been forced into a major retreat. The Wehrmacht had been forced to retreat earlier during the Yelnya Offensive in September 1941 and at the Battle of Rostov (which led to von Rundstedt losing command of German forces in the East), but these retreats were minor compared to the one at Moscow.

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<section id="23787" fatherid="0" title="Background" lv="" priority="-3" level="1">
|300px| |The eastern front at the time of the Battle of Moscow:    
On June 22, 1941, German, Romanian and Slovak troops invaded the Soviet Union, later also joined by Hungary (following the bombing of the Hungarian city Kassa), effectively starting Operation Barbarossa. Having destroyed most of the Soviet Air Force on the ground, German forces quickly advanced deep into Soviet territory using blitzkrieg tactics. Armored units raced forward in pincer movements, pocketing and destroying entire Soviet armies. While the German Army Group North moved towards Leningrad, Army Group South was to take control of Ukraine, while Army Group Center advanced towards Moscow. The Soviet defenses were overwhelmed and the casualties sustained by the Red Army were significant.
By July 1941, Army Group Center had managed to encircle several Soviet armies near Minsk during the Battle of Białystok-Minsk, creating a huge breach in Soviet lines — one that the Soviets couldn't immediately fill, as no reserves were available — and destroying the Soviet Western Front as an organized force. Thus, the Wehrmacht was able to cross the Dnieper river, which barred the path to Moscow, with only minimal casualties.Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Memoirs of a soldier), Smolensk, Rusich, 1999, p. 229.
In August 1941, German forces captured the city of Smolensk, an important stronghold on the road to Moscow. Smolensk was historically considered as the "key" to Moscow because it controlled a landbridge located between the Dvina, Dnieper, and several other rivers, allowing for a fast advance by ground troops without the necessity of building major bridges across wide rivers. The desperate Soviet defense of the Smolensk region lasted for two months, from July 10, 1941 to September 10, 1941.Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1973–1978, entry "Battle of Smolensk" This intense engagement, known as the Battle of Smolensk, delayed the German advance until mid-September, effectively disrupting the blitzkrieg and forcing Army Group Center to use almost half of its strategic reserves (10 divisions out of 24) during the battle.
Elsewhere, the German advance was also bogged down. Near Leningrad, Army Group North was held up by the Luga defense line for almost a month before eventually overrunning it. In the south, Army Group South, which included many Hungarian and Romanian units that were less well trained, equipped and experienced than the Wehrmacht, faced several serious counterattacks and was stopped. The Wehrmacht now faced a dilemma, as Army Group Center was still strong enough to reach Moscow — but such an advance would create a bulge in the German lines, leaving it vulnerable to Red Army flanking attacks. Moreover, according to Hitler, Germany needed the food and mineral resources located in the Ukraine.Guderian, p. 272. Thus, the Wehrmacht was ordered to first secure the Donbass region and to move towards Moscow afterwards.Guderian, pp. 267–9. Heinz Guderian's Panzer Army was turned south to support Gerd von Rundstedt's attack on Kiev, which inflicted another significant defeat on the Red Army. On September 19, 1941, Soviet forces had to abandon Kiev after Stalin's persistent refusal to withdraw forces from the Kiev salient, as recorded by Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov in their respective memoirs.A.M. Vasilevsky, The matter of my whole life, Moscow, Poitizdat, 1978, p. 134.Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Memoirs, Moscow, Olma-Press, 2002, p. 352. This refusal cost Zhukov his post of Chief of the General Staff,Zhukov, p. 353. but his prediction of German encirclement was correct. Several Soviet armies were encircled and annihilated by the Wehrmacht in a double pincer movement, allowing the German forces to advance in the south.Vasilevsky, p. 135.
Although a decisive Axis victory, the Battle of Kiev set the German blitzkrieg even further behind schedule. As Guderian later wrote, "Kiev was certainly a brilliant tactical success, but the question of whether it had a significant strategic importance still remains open. Everything now depended on our ability to achieve expected results before the winter and even before autumn rains."Guderian, p. 305. Hitler still believed that the Wehrmacht had a chance to finish the war before winter by taking Moscow. On October 2, 1941, Army Group Centre under Fedor von Bock, launched its final offensive towards Moscow, code-named Operation Typhoon. Hitler said soon after its start that "After three months of preparations, we finally have the possibility to crush our enemy before the winter comes. All possible preparations were done…; today starts the last battle of the year…."Hitler, in "Völkischer Beobachter", October 10, 1941.

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<section id="23788" fatherid="0" title="Initial German advance (30 September – 10 October)" lv="" priority="4" level="1">
<section id="23789" fatherid="23788" title="Plans" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
For Hitler, Moscow was the most important military and political target, as he anticipated that the city's surrender would shortly afterwards lead to the general collapse of the Soviet Union. As Franz Halder, head of the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army General Staff), wrote in 1940, "The best solution would be a direct offensive towards Moscow."Moscow Encyclopedia, ed. Great Russian Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1997, entry "Battle of Moscow" Therefore, the city was a primary target for the large and well-equipped Army Group Center. The forces committed to Operation Typhoon included three armies (the 2nd, 4th and 9th) supported by three Panzer Groups (the 2nd, 3rd and 4th) and by the Luftwaffe's Luftflotte 2. Overall, more than one million men were committed to the operation, along with 1,700 tanks and 14,000 guns. German aerial strength had been radically reduced. Since the 22 June the Luftwaffe had lost 1,603 aircraft and 1,028 damaged. As a result Luftflotte 2 had only 549 serviceable machines, including 158 medium and dive-bombers and 172 fighters.Bergstöm 2007, p. 90. The attack relied on standard blitzkrieg tactics, using Panzer groups rushing deep into Soviet formations and executing double-pincer movements, pocketing Red Army divisions and destroying them.Guderian, pp. 307–9.
The initial Wehrmacht plan called for two initial movements. The first would be a double-pincer performed around the Soviet Western Front and Reserve Front forces located around Vyazma. The second would be a single-pincer around the Bryansk Front to capture the city of Bryansk. From that point, the plan called for another quick pincer north and south of Moscow to encircle the city. However, the German armies were already battered and experiencing some logistical issues. Guderian, for example, wrote that some of his destroyed tanks had not been replaced, and that his mechanized troops lacked fuel at the beginning of the operation.Guderian, p. 307
Facing the Wehrmacht were three Soviet fronts formed from exhausted armies that had already been involved in heavy fighting for several months. The forces committed to the city's defense totaled 1,250,000 men, 1,000 tanks, 7,600 guns. The Soviet Air Force/Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS) had suffered appalling losses of some 7,500Hardesty, 1991, p.61. or 21,200Bergström 2007, p.118. aircraft. Extraordinary industrial achievements had begun to replace losses, and the VVS had 936 aircraft, 578 of which were bombers for the defense of the capital.Bergström 2007, p.90-91. Even with reinforcements, air strength was down to about a quarter of pre-war strength. Troops and weaponry, while presenting a significant threat to the Wehrmacht based on their numbers alone, were poorly located, with most of the troops deployed in a single line, and had little or no reserves to the rear. In his memoirs, Vasilevsky pointed out that while immediate Soviet defenses were quite well prepared, these errors in troop placement were largely responsible for the Wehrmacht's initial success. Furthermore, many Soviet defenders were seriously lacking in combat experience and some critical equipment (such as anti-tank weapons), while their tanks were obsolete models.Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. "Viaz'ma and Briansk", pp. 74 ff.
The Soviet command began constructing extensive defenses around the city. The first part, the Rzhev-Vyazma defense setup, was built on the Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk line. The second, the Mozhaisk defense line, was a double defense stretching between Kalinin and Kaluga. Finally, a triple defense ring surrounded the city itself, forming the Moscow Defense Zone.  These defenses were still largely unprepared by the beginning of the operation because of the speed of the German advance. Furthermore, the German attack plan had been discovered quite late, and Soviet troops were ordered to assume a total defensive stance only on September 27, 1941. However, new Soviet divisions were being formed on the Volga, in Asia and in the Urals, and it would only be a matter of a few months  before these new troops could be committed,Vasilevsky, p. 138. making the battle a race against time as well.

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<section id="23790" fatherid="23788" title="Vyazma and Bryansk pockets" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
Near Vyazma, the Western and Reserve fronts were quickly defeated by the highly mobile forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer groups that exploited weak areas in the defenses and then quickly moved behind the Red Army lines. The defense setup, still under construction, was overrun as both German armored spearheads met at Vyazma on October 10, 1941. Four Soviet armies (the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd) were trapped in a huge pocket just west of the city.Vasilevsky, p. 139.
Contrary to German expectations, the encircled Soviet forces did not surrender easily. Instead, the fighting was fierce and desperate, and the Wehrmacht had to employ 28 divisions to eliminate the surrounded Soviet armies, using forces that were needed to support the offensive towards Moscow. The remnants of the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts were able to retreat and consolidate their lines around Mozhaisk. Moreover, the surrounded Soviet forces were not completely destroyed, as some of the encircled troops escaped in groups ranging in size from platoons to full rifle divisions. Soviet resistance near Vyazma also provided time for the Soviet high command to quickly bring some reinforcements to the four armies defending the Moscow direction (namely, the 5th, 16th, 43rd and 49th), and to transport three rifle and two tank divisions from the Far East.
In the south near Bryansk, initial Soviet performance was barely more effective than near Vyazma. The Second Panzer Group executed an enveloping movement around the whole front, linking with the advancing 2nd Army and capturing Orel by October 3 and Bryansk by October 6. Luftflotte 2 flew 984 combat missions and destroyed some 679 vehicles on 3 October. On 4 October a mixture of 100 dive-bombers and medium bombers destroyed rail lines and hampered Soviet troop movements in the Sumy-Lgov-Kursk area, severing communications between the Bryansk and South-Western Fronts.Bergström 2007, p.91.  The Soviet 3rd and 13th armies were encircled but, again, did not surrender, and troops were able to escape in small groups, retreating to intermediate defense lines around Poniry and Mtsensk. By October 23, the last remnants had escaped from the pocket.
By October 7, 1941, the German offensive in this area was bogged down. The first snow fell and quickly melted, turning roads into stretches of mud, a phenomenon known as rasputitsa in Russia. German armored groups were greatly slowed and were unable to easily maneuver, wearing down men and tanks.Guderian, p. 316. The 4th Panzer Division fell into an ambush set by Dmitri Leliushenko's hastily formed 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps, including Mikhail Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade, near the city of Mtsensk. Newly built T-34 tanks were concealed in the woods as German panzers rolled past them; as a scratch team of Soviet infantry contained their advance, Soviet armor attacked from both flanks and savaged the German Panzer IV formations. For the Wehrmacht, the shock of this defeat was so great that a special investigation was ordered. Guderian and his troops discovered, to their dismay, that new Soviet T-34s were almost impervious to German tank guns. As the general wrote, "Our T-IV tanks with their short 75 mm guns could only explode a T-34 by hitting the engine from behind." Guderian also noted in his memoirs that "the Russians already learned a few things."Guderian, p. 318. Luftflotte 2 flew 1,400 attacks against Soviet positions to support the 4th Panzer Division, destroying 20 tanks, 34 artillery pieces and 650 vehicles of various kinds.Plocher 1968, p.231.
Elsewhere, massive Soviet counterattacks had further slowed the German offensive.
The 2. Armee operating to the North of Guderian's forces with the aim of trapping the Bryansk front became faced with a strong Soviet counter-attack. The Soviets supported the assault with heavy air-support. Despite being numerically inferior the Luftwaffe inflicted heavy losses to the VVS. 152 Stuka sorties and 259 medium bombers blunted the Soviet attack whilst another 202 Stuka and 188 medium bomber strikes were flown against supply columns in the Brynask area. Soviet Forces were caught in the open, with the Luftwaffe destroying 22 tanks and over 450 vehicles; the Soviet attack had been routed.
The magnitude of the initial Soviet defeat was appalling. According to German estimates, 673,000 soldiers were captured by the Wehrmacht in both pockets,Geoffrey Jukes, The Second World War — The Eastern Front 1941–1945, Osprey, 2002, ISBN 1-84176-391-8, p. 29. although recent research suggests a significantly lower—but still enormous—figure of 514,000 prisoners, reducing Soviet strength by 41 %.Jukes, p. 31. The personnel losses (permament as well as temporary) calculated by the Soviet command are smaller but still enormous, namely 499,001.Glantz, When Titans Clashed p336 n15. The desperate Red Army resistance, however, had greatly slowed the Wehrmacht. When, on October 10, 1941, the Germans arrived within sight of the Mozhaisk line, they found a well-prepared defensive setup and new, fresh Soviet forces. That same day, Georgy Zhukov was recalled from Leningrad to take charge of the defense of Moscow. He immediately ordered the concentration of all available defenses on a strengthened Mozhaisk line, a move supported by Vasilevsky.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 10.  The Luftwaffe still controlled the sky whenever it appeared in strength. The Stukageschwader and Kampfgruppen (Stuka and bomber groups) flew 537 sorties destroying some 440 vehicles (mainly motor vehicles and trucks) and 150 artillery pieces.Plocher 1968, p.231Bergström 2007, p.93
On October 13, Stalin ordered the evacuation of the Communist Party, the General Staff and various civil government offices from Moscow to Kuibyshev (now Samara), leaving only a limited number of officials behind. The evacuation caused panic among Moscovites. From October 16 to October 17, much of the civilian population tried to flee, mobbing the available trains and jamming the roads from the city. Despite all this, Stalin publicly remained in the Soviet capital, somewhat calming the fear and pandemonium.

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</section>
<section id="23791" fatherid="0" title="Mozhaisk defense line (13 October – 30 October)" lv="" priority="5" level="1">
By October 13, 1941, the Wehrmacht had arrived at the Mozhaisk defense line, a hastily constructed double set of fortifications protecting Moscow from the west and stretching from Kalinin towards Volokolamsk and Kaluga. However, despite recent reinforcements, the combined strength of the Soviet armies manning the line (the 5th, 16th, 43rd and 49th armies) barely reached 90,000 men, hardly sufficient to stem the German advance.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 17. In light of the situation, Zhukov decided to concentrate his forces at four critical points: Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. The entire Soviet Western Front, almost completely destroyed after its encirclement near Vyazma, was being recreated from scratch.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 18.
Moscow itself was transformed into a fortress. According to Zhukov, 250,000 women and teenagers  worked, building trenches and anti-tank moats around Moscow, moving almost three million cubic meters of earth with no mechanical help. Moscow's factories were hastily transformed into military complexes: the automobile factory was turned into a submachine gun armory, a clock factory was manufacturing mine detonators, the chocolate factory was producing food for the front, and automobile repair stations were repairing damaged tanks and vehicles.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 22. However, the situation was very dangerous, as the Soviet capital was still within reach of German panzers. Additionally, Moscow was now a target of massive air raids, although these caused only limited damage because of extensive anti-aircraft defenses and effective civilian fire brigades.Braithwaite, pp. 184-210.
On October 13, 1941 (October 15, 1941, according to other sources), the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive. At first, the Germans were unwilling to assault the Soviet defenses directly and attempted to bypass them by pushing northeast towards the weakly protected city of Kalinin, and south towards Kaluga and Tula, capturing all except Tula by October 14. Encouraged by this initial success, the Germans conducted a frontal assault against the fortified line, taking Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on October 18, Naro-Fominsk on October 21, and Volokolamsk on October 27, after intense fighting. Because of the increasing danger of flanking attacks, Zhukov was forced to fall back and withdraw his forces east of the Nara River.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 24.
In the south, the Second Panzer Army was moving towards Tula with relative ease, since the Mozhaisk defense line did not extend that far south, and because there were no significant concentrations of Soviet troops to slow down the advance. The bad weather, fuel problems, and damaged roads and bridges greatly slowed the Germans; Guderian reached the outskirts of Tula only by October 26, 1941.Guderian, pp. 329–30. The German plan initially called for an instant capture of Tula and for a pincer move around Moscow. However, the first attempt to capture the city failed, as German panzers were stopped by the 50th Army and civilian volunteers in a desperate fight. Guderian's army had to stop within sight of the city on October 29, 1941.Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 23–5.

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<section id="23792" fatherid="0" title="Wehrmacht at the gates (1 November – 5 December)" lv="" priority="6" level="1">
<section id="23793" fatherid="23792" title="Wearing down" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
As David Glantz pointed out in his book When Titans Clashed, by late October the Wehrmacht and the Red Army could be compared to "punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other." The German forces were worn out, with only a third of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantry divisions at one-third to one-half strength, and serious logistics issues preventing the delivery of warm clothing and other winter equipment to the front. Even Hitler seemed to surrender to the idea of a long struggle, since the prospect of sending tanks into such a large city without heavy infantry support seemed risky after the costly capture of Warsaw in 1939.Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. "To the Gates", pp. 80ff.
In his study of the Nazi economy, Adam Tooze contends that the very survival of the Red Army as a fighting force indicated that the Germans had lost the conflict in Russia, and thus the world war itself by pointing out that moving east of Smolensk meant stretching German supply lines beyond their effective limit. He highlights that the colossal loss of material on the eastern front - without having won a decisive victory - was bleeding the German economy to death - reaching "a total impasse". He concludes "It was through the achievement of Lebensraum on American scale that the Third Reich hoped to achieve both the standard of affluence and the encompassing reach of global power already attained by Britain and the United States. As events between June and December 1941 made clear, Nazi Germany lacked both the time and the resources to take this first step."Tooze, chapter 15 "December 1941: Turning Point", pp486ff.
To stiffen the resolve of both the Red Army and boost the civilian morale, Stalin ordered the traditional military parade on November 7 to be staged in Red Square. Soviet troops paraded past the Kremlin and then marched directly to the front. The parade had a great symbolic significance in demonstrating the Soviet resolve and was invoked as such frequently in the years to come (see picture.) However, despite such a brave show, the Red Army was actually in a very precarious position. Although 100,000 additional Soviet troops had reinforced Klin and Tula, where new German offensives were expected, Soviet defenses were still relatively thin. Nevertheless, Stalin wanted several preemptive counteroffensives to be launched against the German lines, despite protests from Zhukov, who pointed out the complete lack of reserves.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 27. The Wehrmacht was able to repel most of these counteroffensives, depleting the Red Army of men and vehicles that could have been used for Moscow's defense. The offensive was only successful west of Moscow near Aleksino, where Soviet tanks inflicted heavy losses on the 4th Army because the Germans still lacked anti-tank weapons capable of damaging the new, well-armored T-34 tanks.
Despite the defeat near Aleksino, the Wehrmacht still possessed an overall superiority in manpower and land forces over the Red Army. The German divisions committed to the final assault on Moscow numbered 943,000 men, 1,500 tanks, while Soviet forces were reduced to a shadow of their former selves, with barely 500,000 men, 890 tanks. However, compared to October, Soviet rifle divisions occupied much better defensive positions, a triple defensive ring surrounding the city, and some remains of the Mozhaisk line still in Soviet hands near Klin. Most of the Soviet field armies now had a multilayered defense with at least two rifle divisions in second echelon positions. Artillery support and sapper teams were also concentrated along major roads that German troops were expected to use in their attacks. Finally, Soviet troops — and especially officers — were now more experienced and better prepared for the offensive.
By November 15, 1941, the ground had finally frozen, solving the mud problem. The armored Wehrmacht spearheads were unleashed, with the goal of encircling Moscow and linking up near the city of Noginsk, east of the capital. In order to achieve this objective, the German Third and Fourth Panzer groups needed to concentrate their forces between the Moscow reservoir and Mozhaisk, then proceed to Klin and Solnechnogorsk to encircle the capital from the north. In the south, the Second Panzer Army intended to bypass Tula, still in Soviet hands, and advance to Kashira and Kolomna, linking up with the northern pincer at Noginsk.

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<section id="23794" fatherid="23792" title="Final pincer" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
On November 15, 1941, German tank armies began their offensive towards Klin, where no Soviet reserves were available because of Stalin's wish to attempt a counteroffensive at Volokolamsk, which had forced the relocation of all available reserves forces further south. Initial German attacks split the front in two, separating the 16th Army from the 30th. Several days of intense combat followed. As Zhukov recalls in his memoirs, "The enemy, ignoring the casualties, was making frontal assaults, willing to get to Moscow by any means necessary."Zhukov, tome 2, p. 28. Despite the Wehrmacht's efforts, the multilayered defense reduced Soviet casualties as the Soviet 16th Army slowly retreated and constantly harassed the German divisions trying to make their way through the fortifications.
The Third Panzer Army finally captured Klin after heavy fighting on November 24, 1941, and by November 25, 1941, Solnechnogorsk as well. Soviet resistance was still strong, and the outcome of the battle was by no means certain. Reportedly, Stalin asked Zhukov whether Moscow could be successfully defended and ordered him to "speak honestly, like a communist." Zhukov replied that it was possible, but that reserves were desperately needed. By November 28, the German 7th Panzer Division had seized a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canal — the last major obstacle before Moscow — and stood less than 35 kilometers from the Kremlin; but a powerful counterattack by the 1st Shock Army drove them back across the canal.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 30. Just northwest of Moscow, the Wehrmacht reached Krasnaya Polyana, little more than 20 kilometers from Moscow;Guderian, p. 345. German officers were able to make out some of the major buildings of the Soviet capital through their field glasses. However, both Soviet and German forces were severely depleted, sometimes having only 150 to 200 riflemen (a company's full strength)  in a regiment.
In the south, near Tula, hostilities resumed on November 18, 1941, with the Second Panzer army trying to encircle the city.  The German forces involved were extremely battered from previous fighting, and still had no winter clothing. As a result, initial German progress was only 5 to 10 km (3 to 6 mi) per day, making chances of success "less than certain" according to Guderian.Guderian, p. 340. Moreover, it exposed the German tank armies to flanking attacks from the Soviet 49th and 50th armies, located near Tula, further slowing the advance. However, Guderian was still able to pursue the offensive, spreading his forces in a star-like attack, taking Stalinogorsk on November 22, 1941 and surrounding a Soviet rifle division stationed there. On November 26, German panzers approached Kashira, a city controlling a major highway to Moscow. In response, a violent Soviet counterattack was launched the following day. General Belov's 2nd Cavalry Corps, supported by hastily assembled formations which included 173rd Rifle Division, 9th Tank Brigade, two separate tank battalions, and training and militia units,Erickson, 'The Road to Stalingrad,' p.260 halted the German advance near Kashira.A.P. Belov, Moscow is behind us, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, p. 97. The Germans were driven back in early December, securing the southern approach to the city.Belov, p. 106. Tula itself held, protected by fortifications and determined defenders, both soldiers and civilians. In the south, the Wehrmacht never got close to the capital.
Because of the resistance on both the northern and southern sides of Moscow, the Wehrmacht attempted, on December 1, 1941, a direct offensive from the west, along the Minsk-Moscow highway near the city of Naro-Fominsk. However, this attack had only limited tank support and was forced to assault extensive Soviet defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the Soviet 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and flank counterattacks staged by the 33rd Army, the German offensive was driven back four days later, with the Germans losing 10,000 men and several dozen tanks.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 32.
By early December, the temperatures, so far relatively mild by Russian standards,Glantz, ch.6, subchapter "December counteroffensive", pp. 86ff. dropped as low as twenty to fifty degrees Celsius below zero, freezing German troops, who still had no winter clothing, and German vehicles, which were not designed for such severe weather. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers.Jukes, p. 32. Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use.
The Axis offensive on Moscow stopped. As Guderian wrote in his journal, "the offensive on Moscow failed…. We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on December 5, otherwise the catastrophe would be unavoidable."Guderian, pp. 354–5.

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<section id="23795" fatherid="0" title="Soviet counteroffensive" lv="" priority="7" level="1">
Although the Wehrmacht's offensive had been stopped, German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves  and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred fresh divisions from Siberia and the Far East, relying on intelligence from his spy, Richard Sorge, which indicated that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. The Red Army had accumulated a 58-division reserve by early December, when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin.Zhukov, tome 2, p. 37. However, even with these new reserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men, only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deployment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some critical points. On December 5, 1941, the counteroffensive started on the Kalinin Front. After two days of little progress, Soviet armies retook Krasnaya Polyana and several other cities in the immediate vicinity of Moscow.
The same day, Hitler signed his directive number 39, ordering the Wehrmacht to assume a defensive stance on the whole front. However, German troops were unable to organize a solid defense at their present locations and were forced to pull back to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that discussions with Hans Schmidt and Wolfram von Richthofen took place the same day, and both commanders agreed that the current front line could not be held.Guderian, pp. 353–5. On December 14, Franz Halder and Günther von Kluge finally gave permission for a limited withdrawal to the west of the Oka river, without Hitler's approval.Guderian, p. 354. On December 20, 1941, during a meeting with German senior officers, Hitler cancelled the withdrawal and ordered his soldiers to defend every patch of ground, "digging trenches with howitzer shells if needed."Guderian, pp. 360–1. Guderian protested, pointing out that losses from cold were actually greater than combat losses and that winter equipment was held by traffic ties in Poland.Guderian, pp. 363–4. Nevertheless, Hitler insisted on defending the existing lines, and Guderian was dismissed by Christmas, along with generals Hoepner and Strauss, commanders of the 4th Panzers and 9th Army, respectively. Fedor von Bock was also dismissed, officially for "medical reasons."Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1973–78, entry "Battle of Moscow 1941–42" Walther von Brauchitsch, Hitler's commander-in-chief, had been removed even earlier, on December 19, 1941.Guderian, p. 359.
Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued; in the north, Klin and Kalinin were liberated on December 15 and December 16, as the Kalinin Front drove west. The Soviet front commander, General Konev, attempted to envelop Army Group Center, but met strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt, forming a salient that would last until 1943. In the south, the offensive went equally well, with Southwestern Front forces relieving Tula on December 16, 1941. 
The Luftwaffe was reinforced, as Hitler saw it as the only hope to "save" the situation. Two Kampfgruppen (II./KG 4 and II./KG 30) arrived from refitting in Germany, whilst four Transportgruppen with a strength of 102 Junkers Ju 52 transports were deployed from Luftflotte 4 to evacuate surrounded Heer units and improve the supply line to the front-line forces. It was a last minute effort and it worked. The German air arm was to help prevent a total collapse of Army Group Centre.
Despite the Luftwaffe's best efforts, Soviet air superiority had contributed enormously to the Red Army's victory at Moscow.  Between the 17 December and 22 December the Luftwaffe destroyed 299 motor vehicles and 23 tanks around Tula, hampering the Red Army's pursuit of the German Army.Bergström 2007, p.112-113.
In the center, however, progress was much slower, and Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on December 26, Kaluga on December 28, and Maloyaroslavets on January 2, after ten days of violent action. Soviet reserves ran low, and the offensive halted on January 7, 1942, after having pushed the exhausted and freezing German armies back 100 to 250 km (60 to 150 mi) from Moscow. This victory provided an important boost for Soviet morale, with the Wehrmacht suffering its first defeat. Having failed to vanquish the Soviet Union in one quick strike, Germany now had to prepare for a prolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed.

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<section id="23796" fatherid="0" title="Aftermath" lv="" priority="-8" level="1">
The Red Army's winter counter-offensive drove the Wehrmacht from Moscow, but the city was still considered to be threatened, with the front line still relatively close. Because of this, the Moscow direction remained a priority for Stalin, who at first appeared to be in shock due to the initial German success.Planning for war: the Red Army and the catastrophe of 1941
Europe-Asia Studies,  Dec, 1995  by Cynthia A. Roberts   "Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov, who had pressed Stalin on several occasions to alert and reinforce the army, nonetheless recalled the shock of the German attack when he noted that 'neither the defence commissariat, myself, my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov and K.A. Meretskov, nor the General Staff thought that the enemy could concentrate such a mass of ... forces and commit them on the first day...'" In particular, the initial Soviet advance was unable to level the Rzhev salient, held by several divisions of Army Group Center. Immediately after the Moscow counter-offensive, a series of Soviet attacks (the Battles of Rzhev) were attempted against the salient, each time with heavy losses on both sides. Soviet losses are estimated to be between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men, and German losses between 300,000 and 450,000 men. By early 1943, however, the Wehrmacht had to disengage from the salient as the whole front was moving west. Nevertheless, the Moscow front was not finally secured until October 1943, when Army Group Center was decisively repulsed from the Smolensk landbridge and from the  shore of the upper Dnieper at the end of the Second Battle of Smolensk.
Furious that his army had been unable to take Moscow, Hitler dismissed his commander-in-chief, Walther von Brauchitsch, on December 19, 1941, and took personal charge of the Wehrmacht, effectively taking control of all military decisions and setting most experienced German officers against him. Additionally, Hitler surrounded himself with staff officers with little or no recent combat experience. As Guderian wrote in his memoirs, "This created a cold (chill) in our relations, a cold (chill) that could never be eliminated afterwards."Guderian, p. 365. This increased Hitler's distrust of his senior officers and ultimately proved fatal to the Wehrmacht. Germany now faced the prospect of a war of attrition, something it was not prepared for. Overall the battle was a stinging defeat for the Axis, though not necessarily a crushing one, and it ended German hopes for a quick and decisive victory over the Soviet Union.
For the first time since June 1941, Soviet forces had stopped the Germans and driven them back.  This resulted in Stalin becoming overconfident and deciding to further expand the offensive. On January 5, 1942, during a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin announced that he was planning a general spring counteroffensive, which would be staged simultaneously near Moscow, Leningrad and in southern Russia. This plan was accepted over Zhukov's objections.Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 43–4. However, low Red Army reserves and Wehrmacht tactical skill led to a bloody stalemate near Rhzev, known as the "Rzhev meat grinder," and to a string of Red Army defeats, such as the Second Battle of Kharkov, the failed elimination of the Demyansk pocket, and the encirclement of General Vlasov's army near Leningrad in a failed attempt to lift the siege of the city. Ultimately, these failures would lead to a successful German offensive in the south and to the Battle of Stalingrad.
Nevertheless, the defense of Moscow became a symbol of Soviet resistance against the invading Axis forces. To commemorate the battle, Moscow was awarded the title of "Hero City" in 1965, on the 20th anniversary of Victory Day.

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<section id="23797" fatherid="0" title="Casualties" lv="" priority="9" level="1">
Both German and Soviet casualties during the battle of Moscow have been a subject of debate, as various sources provide somewhat different estimates. Not all historians agree on what should be considered the "Battle of Moscow" in the timeline of World War II. While the start of the battle is usually regarded as the beginning of Operation Typhoon on September 30, 1941 (or sometimes on October 2, 1941), there are two different dates for the end of the offensive. In particular, some sources (such as EricksonJohn Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, table 12.4 and GlantzGlantz, Table B) exclude the Rzhev offensive from the scope of the battle, considering it as a distinct operation and making the Moscow offensive "stop" on January 7, 1942 — thus lowering the number of casualties. Other historians, who include the Rzhev and Vyazma operations in the scope of the battle (thus making the battle end in May 1942), give higher casualty numbers.
There are also significant differences in figures from various sources. John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, gives a figure of 653,924 Soviet casualties between October 1941 and January 1942. Glantz, in his book When Titans Clashed, gives a figure of 658,279 for the defense phase alone, plus 370,955 for the winter counteroffensive until January 7, 1942. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, published in 1973–1978, estimates 400,000 German casualties by January, 1942. Another estimate available is provided in the Moscow Encyclopedia, published in 1997; its authors, based on various sources, give a figure of 145,000 German and 900,000 Soviet casualties for the defensive phase, along with 103,000 German and 380,000 Soviet casualties for the counteroffensive until January 7, 1942. Many of the Soviet casualties, however, consisted of captured men. Therefore, total casualties between September 30, 1941, and January 7, 1942, are estimated to be between 248,000 and 400,000 for the Wehrmacht (GSE / Moscow encyclopedia estimate) and between 650,000 and 1,280,000 for the Red Army (Erickson / Moscow encyclopedia estimate).
Regardless of these disagreements, the Battle of Moscow is considered among the most lethal battles in world history.

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<section id="23798" fatherid="0" title="Footnotes" lv="" priority="-10" level="1">
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<section id="23799" fatherid="0" title="References" lv="" priority="-11" level="1">
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<section id="23800" fatherid="0" title="External links" lv="" priority="-12" level="1">
Category:1941 in the Soviet Union
Category:History of Moscow
Category:Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War
Category:Conflicts in 1941
Category:Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II
Category:World War II aerial operations and battles of the Eastern Front
Category:Battles of World War II involving Germany

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