<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<document>
<title>Battle of Savo Island</title>
<authors>Wikipedia</authors>
<publisher>wikipedia.org</publisher>
<publishedplace>network</publishedplace>
<publishedyear>2010</publishedyear>
<edition></edition>
<category>1942 in Japan</category>
<section id="22878" fatherid="0" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="1">
The Battle of Savo Island, also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the , was a naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II, between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces. It took place on August 8–9, 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign.
In response to Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa brought his task force of seven cruisers and one destroyer down New Georgia Sound (also known as "the Slot") to attack the Allied amphibious fleet and its screening force. The screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley VC, but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were involved in the battle. Mikawa surprised and routed the Allied force, sinking one Australian and three American cruisers, while suffering only moderate damage in return.
The remaining Allied warships and the amphibious force withdrew from the Solomon Islands,  temporarily conceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to the Japanese. Allied ground forces had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before. The withdrawal of the fleet  them in a precarious situation, with barely enough supplies, equipment, and food to hold their beachhead.  Mikawa's failure to destroy the Allied invasion transports when he had the chance, however, would prove to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese as it allowed the Allies to maintain their foothold on Guadalcanal and eventually emerge victorious from the campaign.

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<section id="22879" fatherid="0" title="Background" lv="" priority="-2" level="1">
<section id="22880" fatherid="22879" title="Operations at Guadalcanal" lv="" priority="1" level="2">
On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S. Marines) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Island in the eastern Solomon Islands. The landings were meant to deny their use to the Japanese as bases. From the eastern Solomons, Japanese forces threatened the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia. The Allies also wanted to use the islands as starting points for a campaign to recapture the Solomons, isolate or capture the major Japanese base at Rabaul, and support the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.Hogue, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 235–236.
The overall commander of Allied naval forces in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi operation was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He also commanded the carrier task groups providing air cover. U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commanded the amphibious fleet that delivered the 16,000 Allied troops to Guadalcanal and Tulagi.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 14. Also under Turner was British Admiral Victor Crutchley's screening force of eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, and five minesweepers. This force was to protect Turner's ships and provide gunfire support for the landings. Crutchley commanded his force of mostly American ships from his flagship, the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 621–624.
The Allied landings took the Japanese by surprise. The Allies secured Tulagi, nearby islets Gavutu and Tanambogo, and the airfield under construction on Guadalcanal by nightfall on August 8.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 14–15. On August 7 and August 8, Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting afire the U.S. transport ship George F. Elliott (which sank later) and heavily damaging the destroyer Jarvis.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 90–103. In these air attacks, the Japanese lost 36 aircraft, while the U.S. lost 19 aircraft, including 14 carrier fighter aircraft.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 80.
Concerned over the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' fuel levels, Fletcher announced that he would be withdrawing his carrier task forces on the evening of August 8.Hammel, Carrier Clash, p. 99.
Some historians contend that Fletcher's fuel situation was not at all critical but that Fletcher implied that it was to justify his withdrawal from the battle area.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 104–105; Frank Guadalcanal p. 94; and Morison Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 28. Fletcher's biographer notes that Fletcher concluded that the landing was a success and that no important targets for close air support were at hand. But concerned over the loss of 21 of his carrier fighters, he assessed that his carriers were threatened by torpedo-bomber strikes and wanting to refuel before Japanese naval forces arrived, withdrew as he had previously forewarned Turner and Vandegrift. Turner, however, believed that Fletcher understood that he was to provide air cover until all the transports were unloaded on August 9.Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, p. 368–385.
Even though the unloading was going slower than planned, Turner decided that without carrier air cover, he would have to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal. He planned to unload as much as possible during the night and depart sometime during the next day.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 59.

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<section id="22881" fatherid="22879" title="Japanese response" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
Unprepared for the Allied operation at Guadalcanal, the initial Japanese response included airstrikes and an attempted reinforcement. Mikawa, commander of the newly formed Japanese Eighth Fleet headquartered at Rabaul, loaded 519 naval troops on two transports and sent them towards Guadalcanal on August 7. However, when the Japanese learned that Allied forces at Guadalcanal were stronger than originally reported, the transports were recalled.Frank, p. 87; Loxton, p. 126. The Eighth Fleet was also known as the Outer South Seas Force and included Cruiser Divisions 6 and 18.
Mikawa also assembled all the available warships in the area to attack the Allied forces at Guadalcanal. At Rabaul were the heavy cruiser Chōkai (Mikawa's flagship), the light cruisers Tenryū and Yubari and the destroyer Yunagi. En route from Kavieng were four heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 under Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto: Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa.Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, pp. 193–194, Coombe, Derailing the Tokyo Express, p. 21. After the two transports were recalled, one of them, Meiyo Maru, was sunk near Cape St George, Bougainville at 21:25 on August 8 by the submarine USS S-38 with the loss of 373 personnel. This loss is usually regarded as a separate action from the Battle of Savo Island.
The Japanese Navy had trained extensively in night-fighting tactics before the war, a fact of which the Allies were unaware.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 43–44. Japanese night battle preparations included the use of lookouts intensively trained for night operations, specially designed optical devices for nighttime observation, the long-range Type 93 torpedo, use of battleship and cruiser-carried floatplanes to drop flares, and frequent and realistic fleet night-training exercises. Mikawa hoped to engage the Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the night of August 8 and August 9, when he could employ his night-battle expertise while avoiding attacks from Allied aircraft, which could not operate effectively at night. Mikawa's warships rendezvoused at sea near Cape St. George in the evening of August 7 and then headed east-southeast.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 19, Coombe, Derailing the Tokyo Express, p. 21.

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</section>
<section id="22882" fatherid="0" title="Battle" lv="" priority="3" level="1">
<section id="22883" fatherid="22882" title="Prelude" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
Mikawa decided to take his fleet north of Buka Island and then down the east coast of Bougainville. The fleet would pause east of Kieta for six hours on the morning of August 8. (This would avoid daytime air attacks during their final approach to Guadalcanal.)Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 126. Then they would proceed along the dangerous channel known as "The Slot", hoping that no Allied plane would sight him in the fading light. However, the Japanese fleet was sighted in St George Channel, where their column almost ran into USS S-38, lying in ambush. She was too close to fire torpedoes, but her captain, Lieutenant Commander H.G. Munson, radioed:
TWO DESTROYERS AND THREE LARGER SHIPS OF UNKNOWN TYPE HEADING ONE FOUR ZERO TRUE AT HIGH SPEED EIGHT MILES WEST OF CAPE ST. GEORGE.Toland, John, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936–1945, Random House, 1970, p. 355.
Once at Bougainville, Mikawa spread his ships out over a wide area to mask the composition of his force and launched four floatplanes from his cruisers to scout for Allied ships in the southern Solomons.
At 10:20 and 11:10, his ships were spotted by Australian Hudson reconnaissance aircraft based at Milne Bay in New Guinea.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 88. The floatplanes launched by Mikawa included three Aichi E13A "Jakes" and one Kawanishi E7K2 "Alf". One Jake was shot down by aircraft from USS Wasp, and its crew was killed. (Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 129). The first Hudson misidentified them as "three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders". (Edit: The first Hudson' crew identified the enemy ships correctly. The composition of enemy forces was changed from the aircraft crews' report by Intelligence Officers in Milne Bay) The Hudson's crew tried to report the sighting to the Allied radio station at Fall River, New Guinea. Receiving no acknowledgment, they returned to Milne Bay at 12:42 to ensure that the report was received as soon as possible. The second Hudson also failed to report its sighting by radio, but completed its patrol and landed at Milne Bay at 15:00. It reported sighting "two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type". For unknown reasons, these reports were not relayed to the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal until 18:45 and 21:30, respectively, on August 8.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 139–150. The misidentification of two of Mikawa's cruisers as seaplane tenders by the first Hudson may have been because of the wide dispersal of the Japanese warships; also, the Hudson's crew sighted a floatplane returning. The first Hudson's report was not received by radio because the Fall River station was shut down at that time for an air raid alert. When the second Hudson tried to radio its sighting of Mikawa's force, Fall River refused to receive the report and rebuked the Hudson's crew for breaking radio silence. Loxton calls the claims by Morison, Dull, Richard Newcomb, and other historians that the first Hudson crew made no attempt to radio their sighting report, routinely and leisurely completed their patrol, and then "had tea" before submitting their report at Milne Bay an "outrageous rumor" and "calumny" that is at odds with what he found in his research.
Mikawa's floatplanes returned by 12:00 and reported two groups of Allied ships, one off Guadalcanal and the other off Tulagi. He reassembled his warships and began his run towards Guadalcanal, entering the Slot near Choiseul by 16:00 on August 8. Mikawa communicated the following battle plan to his warships, 
Mikawa's run down the Slot was not detected by Allied forces. Turner had requested that U.S. Admiral John S. McCain, Sr., commander of Allied air forces for the South Pacific area, conduct extra reconnaissance missions over the Slot in the afternoon of August 8. But, for unexplained reasons, McCain did not order the missions, nor did he tell Turner that they were not carried out. Thus, Turner mistakenly believed that the Slot was under Allied observation throughout the day.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 89–92.
The crews of the Allied ships were fatigued after two days of constant alert and action in supporting the landings. Also, the weather was extremely hot and humid, inducing further fatigue and "inviting weary sailors to slackness." In response, most of Crutchley's warships went to "Condition II" the night of August 8, which meant that half the crews were on duty while the other half rested, either in their bunks or near their battle stations.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 32.
In the evening, Turner called a conference on his command ship off Guadalcanal with Crutchley and Marine commander Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift to discuss the departure of Fletcher's carriers and the resulting withdrawal schedule for the transport ships. At 20:55, Crutchley  the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Captain Howard D. Bode of Chicago in charge of the southern group. Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence, contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements. Bode, awakened from sleep in his cabin, decided not to place his ship in the lead of the southern group of ships, the customary place for the senior ship, and went back to sleep. At the conference, Turner, Crutchley, and Vandegrift discussed the reports of the "seaplane tender" force reported by the Australian Hudson crew earlier that day. They decided it would not be a threat that night, because seaplane tenders did not normally engage in a surface action. Vandegrift said that he would need to inspect the transport unloading situation at Tulagi before recommending a withdrawal time for the transport ships, and he departed at midnight to conduct the inspection. Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 96–97.
As Mikawa's force neared the Guadalcanal area, the Japanese ships launched three floatplanes for one final reconnaissance of the Allied ships, and to provide illumination by dropping flares during the upcoming battle. Although several of the Allied ships heard and/or observed one or more of these floatplanes, starting at 23:45 on August 8, none of them interpreted the presence of unknown aircraft in the area as an actionable threat, and no one reported the sightings to Crutchley or Turner.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 165–166.
Mikawa's force approached in a single 3 kilometre (2 mi) column led by Chōkai, with Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Tenryū, Yubari, and Yunagi following. Sometime between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9, lookouts in Mikawa's ships spotted Blue about 9 kilometres (5.5 mi) ahead of the Japanese column.Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 197. Dull says the time was 00:44, Loxton 00:53 (Shame of Savo, p. 171), Morison 00:54 (Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 35), and Frank says 00:50 (Guadalcanal, p. 103).

</section>
<section id="22884" fatherid="22882" title="Action south of Savo" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
To avoid Blue, Mikawa changed course to pass north of Savo Island.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 36. He also ordered his ships to slow to , to reduce wakes that might make his ships more visible.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 103. Four minutes later, Mikawa's lookouts spied either Ralph Talbot about 16 kilometres (10 mi) away or a small schooner of unknown nationality.Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 171.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 103. Morison claims that Blue later sighted a "Japanese auxiliary schooner" in that same area but gives no supporting evidence for why he or Blue believed that the schooner was of Japanese nationality (Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 55). Loxton states that Blue found the schooner to be "harmless" (Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 216). The Japanese ships held their course while pointing more than 50 guns at Blue, ready to open fire at the first indication that Blue had sighted them. When Blue was less than 2 kilometres (1 mi) away from Mikawa's force, she suddenly reversed course, having reached the end of her patrol track, and steamed away, apparently oblivious to the long column of large Japanese ships sailing by her.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 171–173. Seeing that his ships were still undetected, Mikawa turned back to a course south of Savo Island and increased speed, first to , and then to . At 01:25, Mikawa released his ships to operate independently of his flagship, and at 01:31, he ordered, "Every ship attack."Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 197.
At about this time, Yunagi detached from the Japanese column and reversed direction, perhaps because she lost sight of the other Japanese ships ahead of her, or perhaps she was ordered to provide a "rear guard" for Mikawa's force. One minute later, Japanese lookouts sighted a warship to port. This ship was the destroyer Jarvis, heavily damaged the day before and now departing Guadalcanal independently for repairs in Australia. Whether Jarvis sighted the Japanese ships is unknown, since her radios had been destroyed. Furutaka launched torpedoes at Jarvis, which all missed.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 103–104. The Japanese ships passed as close to 1,100 metres of Jarvis, close enough for officers on Tenryū to look down onto the destroyer's decks without seeing any of her crew moving about. If Jarvis was aware of the Japanese ships passing by, she did not respond in any noticeable way.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 176–177.
Two minutes after sighting Jarvis, the Japanese lookouts sighted the Allied destroyers and cruisers of the southern force about 12,500 metres away, silhouetted by the glow from the burning George F. Elliot.Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 178. Several minutes later, at about 01:38, the Japanese cruisers began launching salvos of torpedoes at the Allied southern force ships.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 36–37. At this same time, lookouts on Chōkai spotted the ships of the Allied northern force at a range of 16 kilometres (10 mi).Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 104. Chōkai turned to face this new threat, and the rest of the Japanese column followed, while still preparing to engage the Allied southern force ships with gunfire.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 179–180.
Patterson’s crew was alert because the destroyer's captain had taken seriously the earlier daytime sightings of Japanese warships and evening sightings of unknown aircraft, and told his crew to be ready for action. At 01:43, Patterson spotted a ship, probably Kinugasa, 5,000 meters dead ahead and immediately sent a warning by radio and signal lamp: "Warning! Warning! Strange ships entering the harbor!" Patterson increased speed to full, and fired star shells towards the Japanese column. Her captain ordered a torpedo attack, but his order was not heard over the noise from the destroyer's guns.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 206–207.
At about the same moment that Patterson sighted the Japanese ships and went into action, the Japanese floatplanes overhead, on orders from Mikawa, dropped aerial flares directly over Canberra and Chicago.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 37. Canberra responded immediately, with Captain Frank Getting ordering an increase in speed, a reversal of an initial turn to port, which kept Canberra between the Japanese and the Allied transports, and for her guns to train out and fire at any targets that could be sighted.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 180–184. Less than one minute later, as Canberra’s guns took aim at the Japanese, Chōkai and Furutaka opened fire on her, scoring numerous hits within a few seconds. Aoba and Kako joined in with gunfire, and within the next three minutes Canberra took up to 24 large caliber hits. Early hits killed her gunnery officer, mortally wounded Getting, and destroyed both boiler rooms, knocking out power to the entire ship before Canberra could fire any of her guns or communicate a warning to other Allied ships. The cruiser glided to a stop, on fire, with a 5- to 10-degree list to starboard, and unable to fight the fires or pump out flooded compartments because of lack of power. Since all of the Japanese ships were on the port side of Canberra, the damage to the ship's starboard side occurred either from shells entering low on the port side and exiting below the waterline on the starboard side, or from one or two torpedo hits on the starboard side.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 105. Frank does not believe that Japanese torpedoes hit Canberra and does not discuss the possibility that Allied torpedoes hit the ship. If torpedoes did hit Canberra on the starboard side, then they may have come from a nearby Allied ship, and at this time the U.S. destroyer Bagley was the only ship on that side of the Australian cruiser and had fired torpedoes moments earlier.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 185–205. Loxton firmly believes that Canberra was hit by a torpedo from Bagley, citing survivor accounts, ship's records, and damage assessments. Morison (Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 37–38.) states that Canberra was hit by two torpedoes on the starboard side but believes they were of Japanese origin.
During this time, Patterson engaged in a gun duel with the Japanese column. Patterson received a shell hit aft, causing moderate damage and killing 10 crew members. Patterson continued to pursue and fire at the Japanese ships and may have hit Kinugasa, causing moderate damage.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 107. Patterson then lost sight of the Japanese column as it headed northeast along the eastern shore of Savo Island.Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 207. Bagley, whose crew sighted the Japanese shortly after Patterson and Canberra, circled completely around to port before firing torpedoes in the general direction of the rapidly disappearing Japanese column; one or two of which may have hit Canberra. Bagley played no further role in the battle.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 38–39. Yunagi exchanged non-damaging gunfire with Jarvis before exiting the battle area to the west with the intention of eventually rejoining the Japanese column north and west of Savo Island.Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 199. Chicago’s crew witnessed the gun battle between Jarvis and Yunagi (Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 208).
At 01:44, as Mikawa's ships headed towards the Allied northern force, Tenryū and Yubari split from the rest of the Japanese column and took a more westward course. Furutaka, either because of a steering problem,Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 208. or to avoid a possible collision with Canberra, followed Yubari and Tenryū. Thus, the Allied northern force was about to be enveloped and attacked from two sides.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 107–108.

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<section id="22885" fatherid="22882" title="Action north of Savo" lv="" priority="3" level="2">
Astoria’s bridge crew called general quarters upon sighting the flares south of Savo, around 01:49. At 01:52, shortly after the Japanese searchlights came on and shells began falling around the ship, Astoria’s main gun director crews spotted the Japanese cruisers and opened fire. Astoria’s captain, awakened to find his ship in action, rushed to the bridge and ordered a cease fire, fearful that his ship might be firing on friendly forces. As shells continued to cascade around his ship, the captain ordered firing resumed less than a minute later. However, Chōkai had found the range, and Astoria was quickly hit by numerous shells and set afire.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 41–44. Astoria’s captain's exact words upon arriving on the bridge were, "Topper, I think we are firing on our own ships. Let's not get excited and act too hasty! Cease firing!" Astoria’s gunnery officer replied to this command with, "For God's sake give the word to commence firing!" The captain, after witnessing Chōkai’s fourth salvo straddle his ship, declared, "Whether our ships or not, we will have to stop them. Commence firing!" (Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 226–227.) Between 02:00 and 02:15, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chōkai in pounding Astoria, destroying the cruiser's engine room and bringing the flaming ship to a halt. At 02:16, one of Astoria’s remaining operational main gun turrets fired at Kinugasa’s searchlight, but missed and hit Chōkai’s forward turret, causing moderate damage.Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 231.
Quincy had also seen the aircraft flares over the southern ships, received Patterson’s warning, and had just sounded general quarters and was coming alert when the searchlights from the Japanese column came on. Quincy’s captain gave the order to commence firing, but the gun crews were not ready. Within a few minutes, Quincy was caught in a crossfire between Aoba, Furutaka, and Tenryū, and was hit heavily and set afire. Quincy’s captain ordered his cruiser to charge towards the eastern Japanese column, but as she turned to do so Quincy was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryū, causing severe damage. Quincy managed to fire a few main gun salvos, one of which hit Chōkai’s chart room 6 meters (20 ft) from Admiral Mikawa and killed or wounded 36 men, although Mikawa was not injured. At 02:10, incoming shells killed or wounded almost all of Quincy’s bridge crew, including the captain. At 02:16, the cruiser was hit by a torpedo from Aoba, and the ship's remaining guns were silenced. Quincy’s assistant gunnery officer, sent to the bridge to ask for instructions, reported on what he found: Quincy sank, bow first, at 02:38.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 111–113.
During the engagement, the U.S. destroyers Helm and Wilson struggled to see the Japanese ships. Both destroyers briefly fired at Mikawa's cruisers but caused no damage and received no damage to themselves.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 114.
At 02:16, the Japanese columns ceased fire on the northern Allied force as they moved out of range around the north side of Savo Island. Ralph Talbot encountered Furutaka, Tenryū, and Yubari as they cleared Savo Island. The Japanese ships fixed the U.S. destroyer with searchlights and hit her several times with gunfire, causing heavy damage, but Ralph Talbot escaped into a nearby rain squall, and the Japanese ships  her behind.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 50–51.

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<section id="22886" fatherid="22882" title="Mikawa's decision" lv="" priority="4" level="2">
At 02:16 Mikawa conferred with his staff about whether they should turn to continue the battle with the surviving Allied warships and try to sink the Allied transports in the two anchorages. Several factors influenced his ultimate decision. His ships were scattered and would take some time to regroup.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 115. Mikawa did not know the number and locations of any remaining Allied warships and his ships had expended many of their torpedoes and much of their ammunition.Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 201.
More importantly, Mikawa had no air cover and believed that U.S. aircraft carriers were in the area.  Mikawa was probably aware that the Japanese Navy had no more heavy cruisers in production, and thus would be unable to replace any that he believed he might lose to air attack the next day if he remained near Guadalcanal.Toland, John, ibid, p. 362. He was unaware that the U.S. carriers had withdrawn from the battle area and would not be a threat the next day. Although several of Mikawa's staff urged an attack on the Allied transports, the consensus was to withdraw from the battle area.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 237–239. Therefore, at 02:20, Mikawa ordered his ships to retire.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 53.

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</section>
<section id="22887" fatherid="0" title="Aftermath" lv="" priority="-4" level="1">
At 04:00 on August 9 Patterson came alongside Canberra to assist the cruiser in fighting her fires. By 05:00, it appeared that the fires were almost under control, but Turner, who at this time intended to withdraw all Allied ships by 06:30, ordered the ship to be scuttled if it was not able to accompany the fleet. After the survivors were removed, the destroyers USS Selfridge and USS Ellet sank Canberra with torpedoes and gunfire.Frank, Guadalcanal, pp. 117–118.
Later in the morning of August 9 General Vandegrift advised Admiral Turner that he needed more supplies unloaded from the transports before they withdrew. Therefore, Turner postponed the withdrawal of his ships until mid-afternoon. In the meantime, Astoria’s crew tried to save their sinking ship. Astoria’s fires, however, eventually became completely out of control, and the ship sank at 12:15.Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 57–59.
On the morning of August 9, an Australian coastwatcher on Bougainville radioed a warning of a Japanese airstrike on the way from Rabaul. The Allied transport crews ceased unloading for a time but were puzzled when the airstrike did not materialize. Allied forces did not discover until after the war was over that this Japanese airstrike instead concentrated on Jarvis south of Guadalcanal, sinking her with all hands. The Allied transports and warships all departed the Guadalcanal area by nightfall on August 9.Loxton, Shame of Savo, pp. 250–253. Jarvis shot down two of the attacking Japanese aircraft, whose crews were not recovered.
In the late evening of August 9, Mikawa on Chōkai released the four cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 to return to their home base at Kavieng. At 08:10 on August 10, Kako was torpedoed and sunk by the submarine USS S 44 110 kilometers (70 mi) from its destination. The other three Japanese cruisers picked up all but 71 of her crew and went on to Kavieng.Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 203.
From the time of the battle until several months later, almost all Allied supplies and reinforcements sent to Guadalcanal came by transports in small convoys, mainly during daylight hours, while Allied aircraft from the New Hebrides and Henderson Field and any available aircraft carriers flew covering missions. During this time, Allied forces on Guadalcanal received barely enough ammunition and provisions to withstand the several Japanese drives to retake the islands.Murray, War to be Won, pp. 211–215.
Despite their defeat in this battle, the Allies eventually won the battle for Guadalcanal, an important step in the eventual defeat of Japan. In hindsight, if Mikawa had elected to risk his ships to go after the Allied transports on the morning of August 9, he could have ended the Guadalcanal campaign at its inception, and the course of the war in the southern Pacific could have gone much differently. Although the Allied warships at Guadalcanal that night were completely routed, they did accomplish their mission, which was to protect the vital transports from harm. Many of these same transports were used many times to bring crucial supplies and reinforcements to Allied forces on Guadalcanal over succeeding months.  Mikawa's decision not to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity would prove to be a crucial strategic mistake for the Japanese.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 121.
A formal United States Navy board of inquiry, known as the Hepburn Investigation, subsequently prepared a report of the battle. The board interviewed most of the major Allied officers involved over several months, beginning in December 1942.Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 122. The report recommended official censure for only one officer: Captain Howard D. Bode. The report stopped short of recommending formal action against other Allied officers, including Admirals Fletcher, Turner, McCain, and Crutchley, and Captain Riefkohl. The careers of Turner, Crutchley, and McCain do not appear to have been affected by the defeat or the mistakes they made in contributing to it. Riefkohl, however, never commanded ships again. Captain Bode, upon learning that the report was going to be especially critical of his actions, shot himself in his quarters at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone, on April 19, 1943, and died the next day.Shanks, Sandy, The Bode Testament: Author's Interview,   and Hackett, CombinedFleet.com. Crutchley was gazetted with the Legion of Merit (Chief Commander) in September 1944. Admiral Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory, stating, "Appreciate the courageous and hard fighting of every man of your organisation. I expect you to expand your exploits and you will make every effort to support the land forces of the Imperial army which are now engaged in a desperate struggle."  Later on, though, when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed an opportunity to destroy the Allied transports, he was intensely criticised by his comrades.Loxton, Shame of Savo, p. 267. Admiral Turner later assessed why his forces were so soundly defeated in the battle: 
Historian Richard B. Frank adds that, "This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to (U.S.) Navy pride around Guadalcanal, but after Savo, the United States picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history."

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<section id="22888" fatherid="0" title="See also" lv="" priority="-5" level="1">
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<section id="22889" fatherid="0" title="Notes" lv="" priority="-6" level="1">
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<section id="22890" fatherid="0" title="References" lv="" priority="-7" level="1">
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<section id="22891" fatherid="0" title="External links" lv="" priority="-8" level="1">
</section>
<section id="22892" fatherid="0" title="Further reading" lv="" priority="-9" level="1">
Category:Conflicts in 1942
Category:Pacific Ocean theater of World War II
Category:History of the Solomon Islands
Category:Naval battles involving Australia
Category:Battles involving Japan
Category:Battles involving the United States
Category:Military history of Japan during World War II
Category:1942 in Japan

</section>
</document>
