<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<document>
<title>Attack on Sydney Harbour</title>
<authors>Wikipedia</authors>
<publisher>wikipedia.org</publisher>
<publishedplace>network</publishedplace>
<publishedyear>2010</publishedyear>
<edition></edition>
<category>History of Sydney</category>
<section id="35011" fatherid="0" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="1">
In late May and early June 1942, during World War II, submarines belonging to the Imperial Japanese Navy made a series of attacks on the cities of Sydney and Newcastle in New South Wales, Australia. On the night of 31 May – 1 June, three Ko-hyoteki class midget submarines, each with a two-member crew, entered Sydney Harbour, avoided the partially constructed Sydney Harbour anti-submarine boom net, and attempted to sink Allied warships. After being detected and attacked, the crews of two of the midget submarines scuttled their boats and committed suicide without successfully engaging Allied vessels. These were later recovered by the Allies. The third submarine attempted to torpedo the heavy cruiser USS Chicago, but instead sank the converted ferry HMAS Kuttabul, killing 21 sailors. This midget submarine's fate remained a mystery until 2006, when amateur scuba divers discovered the wreck off Sydney's northern beaches.
Immediately following the raid, the five Japanese fleet submarines that carried the midget submarines to Australia embarked on a campaign to disrupt merchant shipping in eastern Australian waters. Over the next month, the submarines attacked at least seven merchant vessels, sinking three ships and killing 50 sailors. During this period, between midnight and 2:30 am on 8 June, two of the submarines bombarded the ports of Sydney and Newcastle.
The midget submarine attacks and subsequent bombardments are among the best-known examples of Axis naval activity in Australian waters during World War II, and are the only time in history either city has come under attack. The physical effects were minimal: the Japanese had intended to destroy several major warships, but sank only an unarmed depot ship, inflicted minimal damage to Allied shipping, and failed to damage any significant targets during the bombardments. The main impact was psychological; creating popular fear of an impending Japanese invasion and forcing the Australian military to upgrade defences. The military also began convoy operations to protect merchant shipping.

</section>
<section id="35012" fatherid="0" title="Forces" lv="" priority="-2" level="1">
<section id="35013" fatherid="35012" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
</section>
<section id="35014" fatherid="35012" title="Japanese" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
The Imperial Japanese Navy originally intended to use six submarines in the attack on Sydney Harbour: B1 type submarines I-21, I-27, I-28, and I-29, and C1 type submarines I-22 and I-24.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 161Type B1, CombinedFleet.com; Type C1, CombinedFleet.com The six submarines made up the Eastern Attack Group of the 8th Submarine Squadron, under the command of Captain Hankyu Sasaki.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 59
Sometime in late April or early May 1942, I-21 and I-29, each of which carried a Yokosuka E14Y1 "Glen" floatplane for aerial reconnaissance, scouted various Australasian harbours to select the ones most vulnerable to attack by midget submarines.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 163 I-21 scouted Nouméa in New Caledonia, Suva in Fiji, then Auckland in New Zealand, while I-29 went to Sydney in Australia.
On 11 May, I-22, I-24, I-27, and I-28 were ordered to proceed to the Japanese naval base at Truk Lagoon, in the Caroline Islands, to each receive a Ko-hyoteki class midget submarine.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 61 I-28 failed to reach Truk; she was torpedoed on the surface by US submarine USS Tautog on 17 May.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, pp 61–62 The three remaining submarines  Truk around 20 May for a point south of the Solomon Islands.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 62 I-24 was forced to return a day later when an explosion in her midget submarine's battery compartment killed the midget's navigator and injured the commander.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 164 The midget submarine intended for I-28 replaced the damaged midget.

</section>
<section id="35015" fatherid="35012" title="Allies" lv="" priority="-3" level="2">
The Naval Officer-in-Charge of Sydney Harbour at the time of the attack was Rear Admiral Gerard Muirhead-Gould of the Royal Navy.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 30 On the night of the attack, three major vessels were present in Sydney Harbour; the heavy cruisers USS Chicago and HMAS Canberra, and the cruiser HMAS Adelaide. Other warships in the harbour included: destroyer tender USS Dobbin, auxiliary minelayer HMAS Bungaree, corvettes HMAS Whyalla, HMAS Geelong, and HMIS Bombay, armed merchant cruisers HMS Kanimbla and HMAS Westralia, and Dutch submarine K-IX.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 193–194 A converted ferry, HMAS Kuttabul, was alongside at Garden Island where she served as a temporary barracks for sailors transferring between ships. The hospital ship Oranje was also in the harbour, but departed an hour before the attack.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 190
</section>
</section>
<section id="35016" fatherid="0" title="Harbour defences" lv="" priority="3" level="1">
At the time of the attack, the static Sydney Harbour defences consisted of eight indicator loops: six outside the harbour, one between North Head and South Head, and one between South Head and Middle Head, as well as the partially constructed Sydney Harbour anti-submarine boom net between George's Head on Middle Head and Green Point on Inner South Head.Stevens, David (2005). A Critical Vulnerability, pp 192–194 The central section of the net was complete and support piles were in place to the west, but  wide gaps remained on either side.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 65Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, p 193 Material shortages prevented the completion of the boom net prior to the attack.Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, p 194 On the day of the attack, the six outer indicator loops were inactive; two were not functioning and there were not enough trained personnel to man both the inner and outer loop monitoring stations.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 6Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 177 The North Head – South Head indicator loop had been giving faulty signals since early 1940, and as civilian traffic regularly passed over the loop, readings were often ignored.Fullford, We Stood And Waited, p 190
Harbour defence craft included the anti-submarine vessels HMAS Yandra and HMAS Bingera; the auxiliary minesweepers HMAS Goonambee and HMAS Samuel Benbow; pleasure launches converted to channel patrol boats (and armed with depth charges), namely HMAS Yarroma, HMAS Lolita, HMAS Steady Hour, HMAS Sea Mist, HMAS Marlean, and HMAS Toomaree; and four unarmed auxiliary patrol boats.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 66; Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 194

</section>
<section id="35017" fatherid="0" title="Prelude" lv="" priority="-4" level="1">
The Japanese navy used five Ko-hyoteki class midget submarines in an unsuccessful operation against US battleships during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The navy hoped that upgrades to the submarines, intensified crew training, and the selection of a less well defended target would lead to better results and an increased chance of the crews of the midgets to return alive from their mission.  Therefore, on 16 December 1941, the navy initiated plans for a second midget submarine operation.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 58
The plans called for two simultaneous attacks against Allied naval vessels in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. These attacks were intended as diversions ahead of the attack on Midway Island in the North Pacific, with the Japanese hoping to convince the Allies that they intended to attack to the south or west of their conquests.Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, p 68 Eleven submarines of the 8th Submarine Squadron were to carry out the two attacks, the five submarines of the Western Attack Group in the Indian Ocean, and the six submarines of the Eastern Attack Group in the Pacific Ocean . The submarine groups were to select a suitable port of attack, based on their own reconnaissance.
The Western Attack Group selected the port of Diégo-Suarez in Madagascar.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 162 This attack, which occurred at nightfall on 30 May and resulted in the damaging of the battleship HMS Ramillies and the sinking of the tanker British Loyalty, came 22 days after the British captured the port from Vichy France at the beginning of the Battle of Madagascar.
The four potential targets for the Eastern Attack Group were Nouméa, Suva, Auckland, and Sydney. I-21 and I-29 were sent to select the final target, with I-29 sailing to Sydney. On the evening of 16 May, I-29 fired on the 5,135 ton Russian merchant vessel Wellen,  from Newcastle, New South Wales. Although Wellen escaped with minimal damage, shipping between Sydney and Newcastle was halted for 24 hours while aircraft and all available anti-submarine ships from Sydney, including Dutch light cruiser HNLMS Tromp, Australian destroyer HMAS Arunta and US destroyer USS Perkins, searched unsuccessfully for the submarine. Muirhead-Gould concluded that the submarine had operated alone and had  the area immediately after the attack.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 87
I-29’s floatplane made a reconnaissance flight over Sydney on 23 May.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 62 A secret radar unit set up in Iron Cove detected the flight, but authorities dismissed its report as a glitch, as there were no Allied aircraft operating over Sydney.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pp 63–64 The aircraft was damaged or destroyed on landing, although its two crew survived.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 64 They reported the presence of several capital ships, including two battleships or large cruisers, five other large warships, several minor war vessels and patrol boats, and prolific merchant shipping.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 170–171 The report, which the Allied FRUMEL signals intelligence network partially intercepted, resulted in the Japanese navy selecting Sydney as the target.Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, p 192 The three midget-carrying submarines rendezvoused with I-29 and I-21 approximately  north-east of Sydney Heads, with all five submarines in position by 29 May.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 64

</section>
<section id="35018" fatherid="0" title="Midget submarine operation" lv="" priority="5" level="1">
<section id="35019" fatherid="35018" title="Final reconnaissance" lv="" priority="1" level="2">
Before dawn on 29 May I-21’s floatplane performed a final reconnaissance flight over Sydney Harbour, with the mission of mapping the locations of the major vessels and of the anti-submarine net.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 71Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 89 Multiple observers spotted the floatplane but assumed it was a US Navy Curtiss Seagull. No alarm was raised until 5:07 am, when it was realised that the only ship in the area carrying Seagulls was the US cruiser Chicago, and all four of her aircraft were onboard.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 189–193 Richmond Air Force Base launched RAAF Wirraway fighters, which failed to locate I-21 or the floatplane. As a result, the reconnaissance flight did not result in the authorities in Sydney taking any special defence measures. The floatplane was seriously damaged on landing and had to be scuttled, but both aircrew survived.
</section>
<section id="35020" fatherid="35018" title="Plan of attack" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
Japanese planned to launch the midgets one after the other between 5:20 pm and 5:40 pm, from points  outside of Sydney Harbour.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 205 The first midget was to pass through the Heads just after 6:30 pm, but heavy seas delayed her by over an hour. The other two midgets followed at twenty minute intervals and were similarly delayed.
The choice of targets was  up to the midget commanders, with advice that they should primarily target aircraft carriers or battleships, with cruisers as secondary targets.Sasaki, Telegraphic Order 3. (Reproduced in Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 66) The midgets were to operate to the east of the Harbour Bridge, although if no suitable targets were to be found in this area they were to move under the Bridge and attack a battleship and large cruiser believed to be in the inner harbour. When the second reconnaissance flyover revealed that the expected British battleship, HMS Warspite, was nowhere to be found, the USS Chicago became the priority target.Grose A Very Rude Awakening, pgs 75, 79
After completing their mission, the midgets were to depart Sydney Harbour and head south for  to the recovery point off Port Hacking.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 79 Four of the mother submarines would be waiting in an east–west line  long, with the fifth waiting  kilometres further south.

</section>
<section id="35021" fatherid="35018" title="Attack" lv="" priority="3" level="2">
Midget submarine M-14, launched from I-27, was the first to enter Sydney Harbour.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 67 The Middle Head – South Head loop detected it at 8:01 pm, but dismissed the reading due to heavy civilian traffic.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 206 At 8:15 pm, a Maritime Services Board watchman spotted the midget after it passed through the western gap, collided with the Pile Light, then reversed and trapped its stern in the net.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 105 The submarine's bow broke the surface; the watchman rowed towards it to determine what it was and then rowed to the nearby patrol boat HMAS Yarroma to report his finding.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 106Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 208 Despite efforts by Yarroma to pass on this information, Sydney Naval Headquarters did not receive the report until 9:52 pm.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 108 HMA Ships Yarroma and Lolita were dispatched to investigate. Upon confirming that the object in the net was a "baby submarine", Lolita dropped two depth charges while Yarroma’s commander requested permission from Sydney Naval Headquarters to open fire.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 115Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 209 The depth charges failed to detonate, as the water was too shallow for the hydrostatic fuse setting. At 10:35 pm, while Yarroma was waiting for permission to fire, and Lolita was setting up to deploy a third depth charge, the two crewmen on M-14 activated one of the submarine's scuttling charges, killing themselves and destroying the submarine's forward section.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pp 116–117
Muirhead-Gould gave the general alarm, along with orders for ships to take anti-submarine measures, at 10:27 pm; the alarm was repeated at 10:36 pm with advice for ships to take precautions against attack, as an enemy submarine might be in the harbour.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 119 At the time of the first alarm, Sydney Harbour was closed to external traffic, but Muirhead-Gould ordered ferries and other internal traffic to continue, as he believed that having multiple ships travelling around at speed would help force any submarines to remain submerged.
Midget submarine M-24 was the second to enter the harbour. HMAS Falie grazed M-24's hull and reported the contact to command. The report was not followed up. M-24 crossed the indicator loop undetected at 9:48 pm, and at approximately 10 pm followed a Manly ferry through the anti-submarine net.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 210 At 10:52 pm, M-24 was spotted by a Chicago searchlight operator less than  to the moored cruiser's starboard, and on a course roughly parallel to the ship's facing.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 123 Chicago opened fire with a  gun and a quadruple machinegun mount, but inflicted minimal damage as the weapons could not depress far enough.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 211 Some of the  shells skipped off the water and hit Fort Denison's Martello tower, while fragments were later found in the suburbs of Cremorne and Mosman.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 125 The senior officer present aboard Chicago ordered the crew to begin preparing for departure, and for USS Perkins to begin an anti-submarine screening patrol around the cruiser, orders that were revoked by the sceptical Captain Howard Bode when he arrived onboard at around 11:30 pm.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pgs 127, 133
HMA Ships Whyalla and Geelong also fired upon M-24 as it fled west towards the Sydney Harbour Bridge, before the midget was able to submerge and escape.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 212 When it returned to periscope depth, the midget found itself west of Fort Denison. It turned and sailed east for about , then took up a firing position south-west of Bradley's Head, from where its commander could see Chicago’s stern silhouetted against the construction floodlights at Garden Island’s new Captain Cook Graving Dock.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 212–214
Midget submarine M-21, from I-22, probably entered the harbour at the same time that USS Chicago opened fire on M-24.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 68 The unarmed auxiliary patrol boat HMAS Lauriana spotted M-21 and illuminated the submarine's conning tower, while sending an alert signal to the Port War Signal Station at South Head, and the nearby anti-submarine vessel HMAS Yandra. Yandra attempted to ram the submarine, lost contact, regained contact at 11:03 pm, and dropped six depth charges.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 213 At the time of the attack, it was assumed that the depth charges had destroyed or disabled the midget, but M-21 survived. Historians believe that the midget took refuge on the harbour floor and waited until the Allied vessels had moved away before it resumed the attack.
At 11:14 pm, Muirhead-Gould ordered all ships to observe blackout conditions.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 213–214 Just after 11.30 pm, he set off on a barge towards the boom net, to make a personal inspection.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 135 The Admiral reached Lolita at about midnight and indicated to her crew that he did not take the reports of enemy submarines seriously, reportedly saying: "What are you all playing at, running up and down the harbour dropping depth charges and talking about enemy subs in the harbour? There's not one to be seen." The crew reiterated that a submarine had been seen, but Muirhead-Gould remained unconvinced and before he , added sarcastically: "If you see another sub, see if the captain has a black beard. I'd like to meet him."Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 136
Despite the blackout order, the Garden Island floodlights remained on until 12:25 am. About five minutes later, M-24 fired the first of its two torpedoes; it delayed firing the second torpedo for several minutes as the midget submarines would lose longitudinal stability immediately after firing a torpedo.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 214 Historians are divided as to the exact paths of the torpedoes relative to Chicago, although all agree that the US cruiser was the intended target. Both torpedoes missed Chicago, while one torpedo may have also passed close to Perkins' starboard bow. One of the torpedoes continued underneath the Dutch submarine K-IX and HMAS Kuttabul, then hit the breakwater Kuttabul was tied up against.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 139 The explosion broke Kuttabul in two and sank her, and damaged K-IX.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 143Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 215 The attack killed nineteen Royal Australian Navy and two Royal Navy sailors, and wounded another ten. The explosion shook residences in the area and damaged Garden Island's lights and telecommunications. The other torpedo ran aground on the eastern shore of Garden Island without exploding. M-24 then dived and moved to leave the harbour.Jenkins, David (1992). Battle Surface, p 216
A crossing over the indicator loop that was recorded at 1:58 am was initially believed to be another midget submarine entering the harbour, although later analysis showed that the reading indicated an outbound vessel and was therefore most likely represented M-24’s exit.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 70 M-24 did not return to its mother submarine, and its fate remained unknown until 2006.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 189
Ships were ordered to make for the open ocean. Chicago  her anchorage at 2:14 am, leaving a sailor behind on the mooring buoy in her haste to depart. Bombay, Whyalla, Canberra, and Perkins began their preparations to depart.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pp 153–154
Just before 3.00 am, as Chicago was leaving the harbour, the lookouts spotted a submarine periscope passing alongside the cruiser.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 218 At 3:01 am, the indicator loop registered an inbound signal; M-21 was re-entering Sydney Harbour after recovering from the attack four hours previously. HMS Kanimbla fired on M-21 in Neutral Bay at 3:50 am, and at 5 am, three auxiliary patrol boats — HMA Ships Steady Hour, Sea Mist, and Yarroma — spotted the submarine's conning tower in Taylors Bay. The patrol boats had set their depth charge fuses to , and when Sea Mist passed over where the submarine had just submerged and dropped a depth charge, she had only five seconds to clear the area. The blast damaged M-21, which inverted and rose to the surface before sinking again.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 219 Sea Mist dropped a second depth charge, which damaged one of her two engines in the process and prevented her from making further attacks. Steady Hour and Yarroma continued the attack, dropping seventeen depth charges on believed visual sightings and instrument contacts of the midget over the next three and a half hours. At some point during the night, the crew of M-21 committed suicide.
At 4:40 am, HMAS Canberra recorded that the Japanese may have fired torpedoes at her.Grose, Peter (2007). A Very Rude Awakening, pp 160–162. This may have been one of many false alarms throughout the night. However, M-21 had attempted to fire its two torpedoes, but failed because of damage to the bow either from HMAS Yandra’s ramming or depth charges, or a possible collision with USS Chicago, making it possible that M-21 attempted to attack the cruiser. The observer aboard Canberra may have seen bubbles from the compressed air released to fire the torpedoes.

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</section>
<section id="35022" fatherid="0" title="Secondary missions" lv="" priority="6" level="1">
<section id="35023" fatherid="35022" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
As per the operation plan, the five mother submarines waited off Port Hacking on the nights of 1 and 2 June for the midget submarines to return.Carruthers, Steven (2006). Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, pp 88–89 FRUMEL picked up wireless traffic between the five submarines, leading the RAAF to task three Lockheed Hudsons and two Bristol Beauforts with finding the source of the communications. They were unsuccessful. On 3 June, Sasaki abandoned hope of recovering the midget submarines, and the submarines dispersed on their secondary missions.
</section>
<section id="35024" fatherid="35022" title="Attacks on allied merchant shipping" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
Four of the submarines began operations against Allied merchant shipping. I-21 patrolled north of Sydney, while I-24 patrolled south of Sydney.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 239 I-27 began searching off Gabo Island for ships departing Melbourne, and I-29 travelled to Brisbane. I-22  the group to conduct reconnaissance operations, first at Wellington and Auckland in New Zealand, and then at Suva in Fiji.
Between 1 and 25 June, when the four submarines arrived at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands to re-supply before proceeding to Japanese shipyards for maintenance, the four submarines attacked at least seven Allied merchant vessels.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 254 Three of these were sunk: Iron Chieftain by I-24 on 3 June, Iron Crown by I-27 on 4 June, and Guatemala by I-21 on 12 June.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pgs 241, 244, 253 The first two attacks resulted in 12 and 37 fatalities respectively, though the third attack killed no one.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, pgs 191, 193, 199  The attacks forced the authorities to institute changes in merchant traffic; travel north of Melbourne was restricted until a system of escorted convoys was established.Stevens, A Critical Vulnerability, p 195
I-21 was the only submarine to return to Australian waters, where she sank three ships and damaged two others during January and February 1943.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pgs 254, 260–261 During her two deployments, I-21 sank 44,000 tons of Allied shipping, which made her the most successful Japanese submarine to operate in Australian waters.Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy, opp. p 112

</section>
<section id="35025" fatherid="35022" title="Bombardment" lv="" priority="-3" level="2">
On the morning of 8 June I-24 and I-21 briefly bombarded Sydney and Newcastle. Just after midnight, I-24 surfaced  south-south-east of Macquarie Lighthouse.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 247 The submarine's commander ordered the gun crew to target the Sydney Harbour Bridge. They fired ten shells over a four minute period; nine landed in the Eastern Suburbs and one landed in water.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 248 I-24 then crash dived to prevent successful retaliation by coastal artillery batteries.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 248–249 Only one shell detonated, and the only injuries inflicted were cuts and fractures from falling bricks or broken glass when the unexploded shells hit buildings. A United States Army Air Forces pilot, 1st Lt. George Cantello, based at Bankstown Airport was ordered into the air to retaliate, but was killed when engine failure caused his Airacobra to crash in a paddock at Hammondville.P-400 Serial Number ?, Pacific Wreck Database In 1988, following efforts by residents and the US Consulate in Sydney, Hammondville established a memorial park in his honour.
At 2:15 am, I-21 shelled Newcastle, from  north-east of Stockton Beach.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 250 She fired 34 shells over a sixteen minute period, including eight star shells. Again, only a single shell detonated, in the middle of an empty park. Consequently there were no fatalities and only light damage to property.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 251 Fort Scratchley returned fire - the only time an Australian land fortification has fired on an enemy warship during wartime - but the submarine escaped unscathed.Vale, Dana (2002). Fort Scratchley Dedication Dinner speech

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</section>
<section id="35026" fatherid="0" title="Analysis" lv="" priority="-7" level="1">
<section id="35027" fatherid="35026" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
The attack on Sydney Harbour ended in failure on both sides, and revealed flaws in both the Allied defences and the Japanese tactics. During the primary attack, the Japanese lost all three midget submarines in exchange for the sinking of a single barracks ship. The subsequent operations were no more successful as the five large Japanese submarines sank only three merchant ships and caused minimal property damage during the two bombardments. The performance of the Allied defenders was equally poor. One historian states that the lack of damage in Sydney Harbour was due to "a combination of good luck and aggressive counter-attack".Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 74
The main impact of the midget submarine attack and subsequent operations was psychological; dispelling any belief that Sydney was immune to Japanese attack and highlighting Australia's proximity to the Pacific War.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 225
There was no official inquiry into the attacks, despite demand from some sections of the media.  The reason was concern that an inquiry could lead to defeatism and reduce faith in John Curtin's government, particularly after the damaging inquiry into Australian defences that had followed the Japanese aerial attack on Darwin three months earlier.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, pgs 169, 176

</section>
<section id="35028" fatherid="35026" title="Failures in Allied defences" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
The Allies failed to respond adequately to several warnings of Japanese activity off the east coast of Australia prior to the attack; they simply ignored the warnings or explained them away. They attributed the unsuccessful attack on the freighter Wellen on 16 May to a single submarine and assumed it had departed Australian waters immediately after the attack.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 174 The first reconnaissance flight went unnoticed, and although FRUMEL intercepted the report and distributed it to Allied commanders on 30 May, Muirhead-Gould apparently did not react. New Zealand naval authorities detected radio chatter between the Japanese submarines on 26 May and 29 May, and although they could not decrypt the transmissions, radio direction finding indicated that a submarine or submarines were approaching Sydney. The Allies considered dispatching an anti-submarine patrol in response to the 29 May fix, but were unable to do so as all anti-submarine craft were already committed to protecting a northbound troop convoy. The only response to the second reconnaissance flight on 29 May was the launching of search planes.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 193 No other defence measures were put into place. Although the midget attack on Diego Suarez in Madagascar occurred on the morning of 31 May (Sydney time), the Allies sent no alert to other command regions, as they believed that Vichy French forces had launched the attack.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 198
Historians have questioned the competence of the senior Allied officers. Muirhead-Gould had been hosting a dinner party on the night of the attack, and one of the main guests was the senior United States Navy officer in Sydney Harbour, Captain Howard Bode of USS Chicago.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 87 Both officers were sceptical that any attack was taking place.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pg 135 Muirhead-Gould arrived aboard HMAS Lolita at approximately midnight, an action he described as attempting to learn about the situation. But members of Lolita’s crew later recounted that when Muirhead-Gould came aboard he immediately chastised the patrol boat's skipper and crew, and quickly dismissed their report.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 136 Junior officers on Chicago provided similar descriptions of Bode's return on board, and members of both crews later claimed that Muirhead-Gould and Bode were intoxicated.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pp 133–135 It was only after the destruction of HMAS Kuttabul that both officers began to take the attack seriously.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pp 142–143
During the attack, there were several delays between events and responses to them. Over two hours passed between the observation of M-14 in the boom net and Muirhead-Gould's first order for ships to commence anti-submarine actions.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 72 It took another two hours to mobilise the auxiliary patrol boats, which did not leave their anchorage for a further hour. Part of these delays was due to a lack of effective communications.Gill, George Hermon (1968). Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 73 None of the auxiliary patrol craft in the harbour had radio communications, so all instructions and reports came from signal lights via the Port War Signal Station or Garden Island, or by physical communication via launches.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 176 In Muirhead-Gould's preliminary report on the attack, he stated that the Port War Signal Station was not designed for the volume of communications traffic the attack caused.Reproduced in Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 244 Telephone communications with Garden Island were unreliable during the early part of the attack, and then the first torpedo explosion disabled them completely.
The need to keep information secret may also have contributed to the delays and the defenders' scepticism.Fullford, We Stood And Waited, pp 194–195 As the auxiliary patrol boat crews, the indicator loop staff, and other personnel manning defensive positions would have been outside of 'need to know' and would not have been informed about any of the incidents prior to the attack, they would not have been alert, contributing to the disbelief demonstrated in the early hours of the attack.

</section>
<section id="35029" fatherid="35026" title="Flaws in Japanese tactics" lv="" priority="3" level="2">
The main flaw in the Japanese plans was the use of midget submarines for the primary attack. Midget submarines were originally intended to operate during fleet actions: they would be released from modified seaplane carriers to run amok through the enemy fleet.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 68 This concept went out of favour as changing Japanese naval thinking and experience led to recognition that naval warfare would centre around carrier-supported aerial combat. As a result, the midget program's focus changed to the infiltration of enemy harbours, where they would attack vessels at anchor.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 71 This concept failed completely during the attack on Pearl Harbor when the midgets had no effect, and tying up eleven large submarines for six weeks in support of further midget submarine attacks on Sydney and Diego Suarez proved a waste of resources.
Moreover, the failure at Sydney and Diego Suarez demonstrated that the improvements to the midget submarines made after Pearl Harbor had not increased the overall impact of the midget program.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 291 The modifications had various effects. The ability to man and deploy the midgets while the mother ships were submerged prevented the Army coastal radars from detecting the mother submarines. However, the submarines were still difficult to control, unstable, and prone to surfacing or diving uncontrollably.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 70 These manoeuvrability issues contributed to M-14’s entanglement in the anti-submarine net, and the repeated detection of M-21 and M-24.
Beyond the use of the unreliable midgets, historians have identified areas in the plan of attack where the Japanese could have done significantly more damage. If the Japanese midget submarines had conducted a simultaneous, co-ordinated attack, they would have overwhelmed the defences.Fullford, We Stood And Waited, p 188 A chance for more damage came following the destruction of Kuttabul, when several naval vessels headed to sea, including USS Chicago, USS Perkins, Dutch submarine K-IX, HMAS Whyalla, and HMIS Bombay. The five mother submarines were already en route to the Port Hacking recovery position, and although Sasaki's plan at Pearl Harbor had been to leave some submarines at the harbour mouth to pick off fleeing vessels, he did not repeat this tactic.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 155

</section>
<section id="35030" fatherid="35026" title="USS Chicago’s survival" lv="" priority="4" level="2">
Several factors beyond the control of any of the combatants contributed to the survival of USS Chicago. At the time of M-24’s attack on Chicago, the latter had spent some time preparing to depart from Sydney Harbour, and although still moored and stationary, was producing large volumes of white smoke as the boilers warmed up.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 137 This smoke, streaming to the stern under the influence of the wind, and contrasting against the dark, low-lying cloud, may have given the impression that Chicago was moving, causing M-24 to lead the target when firing its torpedoes, and consequently sending its torpedoes across the bow.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, pp 137–139 Another factor that may have influenced Chicago’s survival was the extinguishing of Garden Island's floodlights minutes before M-24 fired its first torpedo, impeding targeting.
</section>
<section id="35031" fatherid="35026" title="Bombardment impact" lv="" priority="5" level="2">
The bombardments failed to cause significant physical damage, but had a major psychological impact on the residents of Sydney and Newcastle. Due to the inaccuracy of the submarines' range-finding equipment, coupled with the unstable firing platform of a submarine at sea, specific targeting was impossible. The intention of the submarine bombardment was to fen the population of the target area.
The failure of the majority of the shells to detonate may have had various causes. As the submarines fired armour piercing shells, intended for use against steel ship hulls, the relatively softer brick walls may have failed to trigger the impact fuses.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 249 Sea water may have degraded the shells, which the Japanese had stored in deck lockers for several weeks. The age of the shells may also have been a factor; some of the shells recovered from the Newcastle bombardment were found to be of English manufacture; surplus munitions from World War I.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 197
In Sydney, fear of an impending Japanese invasion caused people to move west; housing prices in the Eastern Suburbs dropped, while those beyond the Blue Mountains rose significantly.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 258 The attack also led to a significant increase in the membership of volunteer defence organisations, and strengthening of defences in Sydney Harbour and Port Newcastle.Nichols, The Night the War Came to Sydney, pp 28–29

</section>
</section>
<section id="35032" fatherid="0" title="Aftermath" lv="" priority="-8" level="1">
<section id="35033" fatherid="35032" title="" lv="" priority="-1" level="2">
The papers did not publish news of the submarine attack until 2 June, as most of the attack occurred after the newspapers went to press on the morning of 1 June.Jenkins, David (1992). Battle Surface, p 225 Instead, on the morning after the attack, the front pages carried news of Operation Millennium, the Royal Air Force's first 1,000-bomber raid, although several newspapers included a small interior article mentioning the final reconnaissance flyover. The Federal Censor ordered total censorship of the events, issuing an official statement on the afternoon of 1 June which reported that the Allies had destroyed three submarines in Sydney Harbour, and described the loss of Kuttabul and the 21 deaths as the loss of "one small harbour vessel of no military value".Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pgs 156, 187 Smith's Weekly finally released the real story on 6 June, and follow-up material in the 13 June issue caused more political damage, prompting the Royal Australian Navy to attempt to charge the newspaper with releasing defence information.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pgs 212, 223–227
It was several days before the 21 dead sailors aboard Kuttabul could all be recovered.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 151 On 3 June, Muirhead-Gould and over 200 Navy personnel attended a burial ceremony for these sailors. On 1 January 1943, the Navy base at Garden Island was commissioned as HMAS Kuttabul in commemoration of the ferry and the lives lost.Elbourne, Wonderful Kuttabul
The Australians recovered the bodies of the four Japanese crew of the two midget submarines sunk in Sydney Harbour and had them cremated at Rookwood Cemetery. For the cremation the Allies draped the Japanese flag over each coffin and rendered full naval honours. Muirhead-Gould was criticised for this, but defended his actions as respecting the courage of the four submariners, regardless of their origin.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 230 Australian politicians also hoped that the Japanese Government would notice the respect paid to the sailors and improve the conditions Australian prisoners-of-war were experiencing in Japanese internment camps.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 231 Japanese authorities noted the funeral service, but this did not lead to any major improvement in conditions for Australian POWs. Following the use of the midget submariners' funeral by the Japanese for propaganda purposes, the Australian High Command forbade similar funerals for enemy personnel in the future.Warner -anddocsymbol- Seno, The Coffin Boats, p 130
An exchange of Japanese and Allied diplomatic personnel stranded in the opposing nations occurred in August 1942, which allowed Tatsuo Kawai, the Japanese ambassador to Australia, to return home with the ashes of the four Japanese submariners. When the exchange ship Kamakura Maru arrived in Yokohama, several thousand people were present to honour the four men.Jenkins, Battle Surface, pp 232–233
The two main targets of the attack, USS Chicago and HMAS Canberra, were both lost within the next year: Canberra sinking on 9 August 1942 during the Battle of Savo Island, and Chicago on 30 January 1943 following the Battle of Rennell Island.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, pgs 150–153, 273 None of the Japanese submarines involved in the attack survived the war. USS Charrette and USS Fair sank I-21 on 4 February 1944 off the Marshall Islands. An American torpedo boat sank I-22 on 25 December 1942 off New Guinea. An American patrol craft sank I-24 on 10 June 1943 near the Aleutian Islands. HMS Paladin and HMS Petard sank I-27 on 12 February 1943 off the Maldives. Lastly, USS Sawfish sank I-29 on 26 July 1944 in the Philippines.Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 216

</section>
<section id="35034" fatherid="35032" title="M-14 and M-21" lv="" priority="2" level="2">
The Allies located and recovered M-21 on 3 June and M-14 on 8 June.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, pgs 209, 219 Although both were damaged during the attack, it was possible to assemble a complete submarine from the two vessels. The centre section of the rebuilt submarine was mounted on a trailer and taken on a  tour throughout southern New South Wales, Victoria, and western South Australia.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 250 The purpose of the tour was twofold; it allowed Australians to see a Japanese midget submarine up close, and was used to raise A£28,000 for the Naval Relief Fund and other charities.Warner -anddocsymbol- Seno, The Coffin Boats, p 169 The submarine arrived at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra on 28 April 1943, flying the White Ensign and a paying-off pennant. The submarine was originally displayed outside the museum in three separate pieces,Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 251 but was moved inside in the 1980s due to heavy vandalism; on one occasion in 1966, a group of university students painted it b yellow in response to The Beatles' song Yellow Submarine.Grose, Peter (2007). A Very Rude Awakening, pp 253–255 The composite submarine was restored and remains on display inside the Memorial as part of a permanent exhibition on the attack, next to the recovered wheelhouse of HMAS Kuttabul. The conning tower from M-21 is on display at the Royal Australian Navy Heritage Centre on Garden Island. Leftover material from M-21 was melted down and made into souvenirs following the construction of the combined vessel.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 253
</section>
<section id="35035" fatherid="35032" title="M-24" lv="" priority="3" level="2">
Over the 64 years following the disappearance of M-24 after the attacks, more than 50 people approached the Royal Australian Navy claiming to have found the submarine. All of these claims were found to be false.McNicoll, Nine's midget submarine scoop scuttled One early theory about the midget's fate was that it was damaged or destroyed, along with M-21, in or around Taylors Bay, which would account for reports from Steady Hour and Yarroma of multiple submarines during their three-hour attack against M-21.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945, p 71 A second theory was that the midget attempted to return to the mother submarines but exhausted its battery power before reaching the Port Hacking recovery point and would therefore be outside and to the south of Sydney Heads. The third theory was that the midget's crew decided to avoid endangering the five larger submarines during the recovery process, and either ran straight out to sea or headed north.Jenkins, Battle Surface, p 217Carruthers, Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942, p 184
A group of seven amateur scuba divers solved the mystery of M-24’s fate in November 2006, when they found a small submarine sitting up on the seabed, approximately  from Bungan Head, off Sydney's Northern Beaches.Found it! 60 Minutes segment Commander Shane Moore, the officer responsible for the Royal Australian Navy's heritage collection, confirmed that the wreck was M-24 after viewing footage from multiple dives, along with measurements the group had taken. The wreck had several bullet holes in it, most likely from Chicago's quadruple machine-gun mount. The location of the wreck was kept secret by both the divers and the navy, with Defence Minister Brendan Nelson promising to have the wreck protected as a war grave. The wreck was gazetted on 1 December 2006 as a heritage site.M24 Japanese Midget Submarine wreck site, New South Wales Heritage Office A  exclusion zone was established around the wreck site, and any vessels entering the zones are liable to fines under New South Wales law of up to A$1.1 million, with additional fines and confiscation of equipment under Commonwealth law.Grose, A Very Rude Awakening, p 255 Shore- and buoy-mounted surveillance cameras and a sonar listening device further protect the site.
On 7 February 2007, during JMSDF Admiral Eiji Yoshikawa's visit to Australia, Yoshikawa and RAN Vice Admiral Russ Shalders  presided over a ceremony held aboard HMAS Newcastle to honour M-24’s crew.Wurth, Fallen submariners honored in Australia Relatives of the midget submarines' crews, one of the survivors from Kuttabul, and dignitaries and military personnel from Australia and Japan attended another ceremony on 6 August 2007 at HMAS Kuttabul.McNicoll, D.D. (2007). Ceremony ends missing sub saga HMAS Melbourne then carried relatives of M-24’s crew to the wreck site, where they poured sake into the sea before being presented with sand taken from the seabed around the submarine.

</section>
</section>
<section id="35036" fatherid="0" title="Footnotes" lv="" priority="-9" level="1">
Some sources give the date of the reconnaissance flight as 30 May.
 As this midget submarine was the only one not recovered, its specific designation is unknown, and is referred to differently in the various sources. Gill refers to it as Midget A, Jenkins refers to it as Ban's midget (after the midget's commander, Sub–Lieutenant Katsuhisa Ban), and Carruthers refers to it as I-24, naming it after the mother submarine. Numerous sources discussing the 2005 and 2006 findings (such as newspaper articles) refer to it as M-24 or M24. This article uses the M-24 designation for consistency with the identified midget submarines and to avoid confusion with the mother submarine.

</section>
<section id="35037" fatherid="0" title="References" lv="" priority="-10" level="1">
</section>
<section id="35038" fatherid="0" title="Bibliography" lv="" priority="-11" level="1">
</section>
<section id="35039" fatherid="0" title="External links" lv="" priority="-12" level="1">
Category:Conflicts in 1942
Category:1942 in Australia
Category:History of Sydney
Category:History of New South Wales
Category:Military attacks against Australia
Category:South West Pacific theatre of World War II
Category:Military history of Sydney during World War II
Category:Shipwrecks of New South Wales

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</document>
